

Red Star Over Indochina

By Nevin Gussack

The communist attempt to conquer all of Indochina from the 1940s until the 1970s could be characterized by three factors:

- 1) Conscription of Western and American leftists to demoralize the home front and disseminate propaganda on behalf of the communist enemy.
- 2) Constant military buildup of the North Vietnamese armed forces, even in violation of the Geneva Accords.
- 3) The subversion of South Vietnamese and other noncommunist Indochinese nations.
- 4) North Vietnam (later Vietnam) working part and parcel with the USSR in promoting international revolution.
- 5) Absorption of American technology and military equipment as a consequence of the Nixon-Kissinger betrayal and leftwing subversion.

The North Vietnamese/Viet Minh laid out a psychological warfare strategy during their struggle against the French and their Vietnamese supporters. Such a propaganda and psychological warfare campaign conducted by the Vietnamese Communists (called the Viet Minh during the period of the war against the French and their Indochinese allies) helped accelerate the defeat of the French forces and their Vietnamese allies. In 1946, top Vietnamese Communist Truong Chinh noted *"Concerning our foreign policy what must our people do? We must isolate the enemy, win more friends. We must act in such a way that the French people...will actively support us...that all peace loving forces in the world will defend us and favor the aims of our resistance...The French people and soldiers should oppose the war by every means: oppose the sending of troops to Indochina, oppose military expenditure for the reconquest of Vietnam...They should demand from the French government peaceful negotiations with the Ho Chi Minh government. The French soldiers in Vietnam should demand repatriation, protest against the setting up of a puppet government."*¹ North Vietnamese General Giap noted that *"Our foreign policy was directed to winning the support of the people throughout the world, and particularly to influence the French public opinion against the war."* North Vietnamese General Nguyen Van Hinh said *"In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept its conditions."*² The French Communist Party (PCF) maintained links with the Viet Minh throughout the period of the First Indochinese War of 1946 to 1954. The Party and its sympathizers sabotaged the war effort in France. Forty percent of weapons and supplies for French forces in Indochina were sabotaged before they reached their destination. The North Vietnamese and the PCF also cooperated in carrying out propaganda work among South Vietnamese students studying in Paris.³ Over 25% of the French Parliament during the First Indochina War (1946-1954) was composed of Communists and this provided a liaison with the Viet Minh to provide valuable intelligence. The Viet Minh exploited the divisions within the French communities in Hanoi and Paris. French Communist mobs stoned

¹ Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1975) page 80.

² Miranda, Joseph. "Political Warfare The Decisive Strategy" The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, Winter 1983 pages 427-448

³ Greig, Ian. The Assault on the West (Foreign Affairs Publishing Company 1968) pages 140-169.

trains unloading wounded soldiers in their home towns and abused departing troops at the train stations.⁴ The defecting Hungarian communist diplomat Janos Radvanyi noted that “*Not surprisingly, the French Communist party mobilized itself behind Ho Chi Minh's war effort. Together with the Confederation General du Travail, it organized protest demonstrations, strikes, and walk-outs, and party intelligence workers began sabotaging military hardware moving through French ports to Indochina.*”⁵

During the formative years of the Indochinese Communist Party (later the Workers' Party of Vietnam), Ho Chi Minh and his comrades laid out their plans for the subjugation of Southeast Asia. Contrary to the propaganda of the American Left, the Vietnamese Communists maintained that their long-term goal was an Indochinese Communist Federation under Hanoi's domination. The communist war in Indochina did not stop with the conquest of South Vietnam. In 1932, Ho Chi Minh and the Indochinese Communist Party drew up the “*Action Programme*” which called for “*a fraternal union of all nationalities of Indochina.*” In 1951, the Workers' Party of Vietnam called for “*the federation of the states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.*”⁶

After the defeat of the French and their allies in 1954, some of North Vietnam's allies felt that political and diplomatic warfare could be used to split the Western bloc apart on the issue of reunification of the two Vietnams through elections. Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai noted to Ho Chi Minh that “*It is possible to gain all Vietnam through peace... It is possible to unite Vietnam through elections when (the) time is ripe. This requires good relations with south-east Asian countries as well as among the Indochinese countries...The answer is to unite them through peaceful efforts. Military means can only drive them to the American side...Peace can increase the rift between France and the USA...Peace can drive Great Britain and the USA apart...All in all, peace has all the advantages. It can isolate the USA...If the Americans should block peace, we cannot but fight on...We will be morally in the right. Everyone will sympathize with us. Peace will come eventually after a period of fighting. By that time, the USA will be more isolated.*”⁷

North Vietnam also pursued the strategy of possible military conquest of South Vietnam through its regular forces and irregular guerrillas and terrorists. Hanoi quickly increased its troop numbers for its regular army and started to acquire both light and heavy weapons from the USSR and China. Hanoi soon violated the Geneva Accords on the number of troops and types of equipment held by its armed forces. Governor Tran Van Lam of South Vietnam charged that North Vietnam kept sleepers in the non-communist zones. These sleepers were composed of demobilized soldiers and civilians who were drafted into a “*popular army.*”⁸ In 1955, the US and South Vietnam charged that North Vietnam increased their army by four to six divisions, equipped with Soviet bloc-made weapons that were shipped to Hanoi via China.⁹ In June 1956, it was reported that the North Vietnamese army had a little less than 20 divisions, who were advised by 5,000 Red Chinese personnel. The North Vietnamese army received T-34 tanks,

⁴ Joes, Anthony. Victorious Insurgencies (University Press of Kentucky 2010).

⁵ Radvanyi, Janos. Delusion and Reality (Gateway Editions, University of Michigan 1978) page 4.

⁶ The World and I Volume 2 Issue 4 1987 page 140.

⁷ Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know (Clarendon Press, University of Michigan 1997) pages 158-161.

⁸ “Reds Said to Plant Fifth Column” New York Times October 8, 1954 page 8.

⁹ “Geneva Breach Cited” New York Times July 1, 1955 page 10.

artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons from the communist countries.¹⁰ South Vietnamese President Diem charged that the North Vietnamese army increased its number of troops from 450,000 to 500,000 in 1957.¹¹ It was reported that in the mid-1950s, an estimated 5,000-10,000 Viet Minh political workers remained in the South to agitate against South Vietnam and to support a French and North Vietnamese-endorsed plebiscite that would have benefited Hanoi. Later estimates revealed that the Viet Minh left 50,000-60,000 political and military cadres in the South in the mid-1950s.¹² In 1954-1955, Viet Minh agents remained in the South undetected and launched occasional attacks in rural areas and infiltrated into the Diem government and other institutions in the cities. The North Vietnamese forces that withdrew in the period 1954-1956 looted and destroyed public buildings, railroads, destroyed or stole files and documents from government offices and the land registries located in the South Vietnamese provinces near the 17th Parallel.¹³ Such pilferage and selective destruction mirrored the actions taken by North Vietnam in its conquest and occupation of South Vietnam in April 1975. It also mimicked the systematic looting and exploitation undertaken by the Soviet Red Army in 1944 and 1945 as it invaded much of Eastern Europe and Germany.

It also appeared that the demoralization and withdrawal of the French from North Vietnam in 1954 and 1955 inadvertently left the communists with American and French-made firearms. Paris foolishly allowed the communists to retain these weapons, while other American-made arms were forwarded by the Red Chinese, who in turn inherited or captured them from Chiang Kai-shek's betrayed Nationalist forces. In 1954, the Viet Minh captured at least two American-made M-24 tanks and they were consequently used for propaganda purposes. In 1956, the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) formed an armored company which consisted of M-8 armored cars and M-3 half-tracks. These weapons either were captured from the French or passed from captured Nationalist stocks held by the Chinese Communists. These American-made armored vehicles participated in a parade in Hanoi in 1956.¹⁴ In 1959, the 202nd Armored Regiment was formed by the North Vietnamese army and had as its equipment Soviet-made SU-76 guns, US-made M-8 armored cars, US-made M-24 tanks, and some World War II era Japanese arms.¹⁵

Evidence also existed regarding the North Vietnamese transferring of Western-made weapons to various leftist and communist revolutionaries in foreign countries. The General Military Party Committee and the Ministry of Defense's Ordnance Department in North Vietnam passed firearms to the leftist Algerian FLN rebels in that French-held colony in 1958. The declassified document noted that the North Vietnamese *"arranged for a large quantity of Tulle submachine guns (weapons captured by our forces during the resistance war against the French) to be wrapped and packaged so that they could be provided to the Algerian people to help them in their resistance war against the French colonialists."* The Tulle submachine guns actually were the MAT-49s captured by the Viet Minh from the defeated French forces and their

¹⁰ "Viet Minh's 20 Divisions" Times (London) June 12, 1956 page 9.

¹¹ "Ngo Says Reds Have 3-to-1 Troop Margin" New York Times October 30, 1957 page 11.

¹² Hennessy, Michael Strategy in Vietnam (Praeger Publishers Westport CT 1997) page 40.

¹³ Trager, Frank N. Why Vietnam? (Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) page 164.

¹⁴ "North Vietnamese Armored Forces" Accessed From:

http://15thengineer.50megs.com/9th_&_vn_history.htm

¹⁵ Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing 2012) page 48.

Vietnamese allies. The weapons were transferred onto a Polish merchant ship and then unloaded under the guise of commercial goods for the FLN.¹⁶

Large stores of captured Western and Japanese-made weapons were also transferred by the North Vietnamese to their puppet Viet Cong forces in the South during the 1950s and early 1960s. Between 1965 and 1968, these older Western and Japanese-made firearms were passed down to the VC Local Forces. These weapons included French MAS 36 rifles, MAS 38 SMG, Berthier rifles, Mle 1892 and Mle 1916 carbines, and Japanese Type-38 and Type-99 rifles and light machine guns. These were left behind by French and Japanese forces in the 1940s and 1950s. The Soviets, East Germans, and Czechoslovaks also sent ex-Nazi STG-44 assault rifles, Mauser K-98 rifles, MP-40 submachine guns, and MG-34 light machine guns to North Vietnam. These firearms were then forwarded to VC forces in the South.¹⁷

The North Vietnamese quasi-diplomatic representatives in South Vietnam sought to exploit their presence for the purpose of subverting and ultimately weakening the quasi-fascistic dictatorship of President Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN-North Vietnamese) officers were present in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Conference. Senior North Vietnamese officers were stationed in South Vietnam, along with their interpreters and political cadres. They were members of the Joint Commission, its sub commissions and teams, and liaison officers attached to the ICC headquarters. The ICC and its personnel were formed to monitor elections that were originally intended to reunify the two Vietnams. After the mid-1950s, the ICC monitored alleged violations of the Geneva Accords by both the North and South. The North Vietnamese officers stationed in South Vietnam asserted their control over the local communist movement. North Vietnamese Colonel Ha Van Lau was the head of the PAVN Liaison Mission to the ICC since 1954.¹⁸ In 1955, North Vietnam set up a liaison mission in South Vietnam (RVN-Republic of Vietnam) and set up radio communications equipment to pass information from Hanoi to Viet Cong cells in the RVN. Diem requested that the North Vietnamese mission be withdrawn in 1958 and the radio equipment was removed.¹⁹

Amazingly, even US defectors and some captured POWs were brainwashed into supporting the Vietcong and North Vietnamese on the battlefield and propaganda front. Clearly, they were not a majority. However it is true that even a small, well organized cadre of individuals can make a difference in assisting a country in promoting their interests. Once again, the North Vietnamese/Viet Minh made use of captured POWs. There were reports that some French POWs intensive indoctrination in communist revolutionary doctrine and anti-colonialism at re-education centers before they were repatriated to French African and North African colonies. The Viet Minh separated officers, non-commissioned officers, and other enlisted troops. They separated colonials from Legionnaires, and French regulars from all other troops. They separated the prisoners by race and emphasized the differences in races between

¹⁶ "Ordnance: Chronology of Historical Events Volume 1" June 23, 1958 Accessed From: <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110524>

¹⁷ "Weapons of the Vietnam War" Accessed From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_of_the_Vietnam_War#Small_arms_2

¹⁸ Nutt, Anita Lauve. Prisoners of War In Indochina (Rand Corporation Santa Monica CA January 1969) Accessed From: http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Personnel_and_Personnel_Readiness/POW_MIA/34.pdf

¹⁹ Bergen, John D. Military Communication: A Test for Technology (Center of Military History Government Printing Office 1985) page 20.

Europeans, the blacks, and the Arabs. African and North African colonial troops were subjected to Marxist-Leninist reeducation. Ex-French colonial soldiers became revolutionaries after return to their home states and interestingly, Legionnaires and paratroopers became the French fascist extremists.²⁰

George Boudarel was a Frenchman who served as the Deputy Political Commissar in Vietnamese prison camps during the First Indochina War. Boudarel was in charge of the Viet Minh brainwashing program of French prisoners. He served in the COMINTERN underground in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. French POWs in Viet Minh prison camps were subjected to forced labor and separated according to race. Re-education in Marxism-Leninism was concentrated on the African and Northern African colonial troops of the French Army. It was reported by the National Alliance of Families that French *“colonial soldiers became revolutionaries after return to their home states; and, oddly, Legionnaires and paratroopers became the French extreme right-wing militarist.”*²¹

The Viet Minh's Enemy Proselytizing Department (EPD) also targeted French POWs from its overseas colonial empire serving in its Foreign Legion and regular armed forces for recruitment and brainwashing. The Communist Parties in Algeria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, France, Greece, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Tunisia assisted the North Vietnamese EPD in these efforts. French Communist Party members and undercover communists in the French armed forces such as Navy Petty Officer Henri Martin distributed flyers and leaflets to the French soldiers and officers. Martin was arrested in 1951. The ruling East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) also sent flyers to German-speaking Foreign Legion personnel via China and the USSR to Viet Minh zones for distribution to EPD personnel. Three East German SED members also worked with the EPD in Vietnam in targeting German-speaking personnel and were involved in brainwashing activities against captured German-speaking Foreign Legion troops. Their units also posed as French forces before attacking French positions. Another ethnic Vietnamese who collaborated with the Nazis in Paris and Berlin Hoang Van Nhi (Willy Hoang) headed the effort to write psychological warfare leaflets against German-speaking units of the Foreign Legion. He was assigned to the Nam Bo/COSVN Political Staff EPD and was a political commissar for German speaking Foreign Legion defectors to North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese EPD also arranged prisoner releases of French soldiers and civilians who were double agents for Hanoi and were assigned to create a fifth column in the French armed forces. The Military Proselytizing Department (MPD) maintained agents in South Vietnamese (RVN) territory. They consisted of agents in South Vietnam who communicated through secret radio networks, couriers flown on ICC flights to Hanoi, land courier lines across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the official North Vietnamese delegation to the International Control Commission (ICC) in Saigon. The Moroccan, Tunisian, French, and Algerian Communist Parties induced the defection of 500 African Foreign Legion troops to Viet Minh zones at the behest of the USSR.²²

²⁰ “The French Experience” Accessed From:
<http://www.nationalalliance.org/vietnam/ovrvw12.htm>

²¹ “The French Experience” Accessed From:
<http://www.nationalalliance.org/vietnam/ovrvw12.htm>

²² Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations. Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense Enemy Proselytizing Department December 1979 Accessed From: <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi->

Defectors and brainwashed US POWs also served the North Vietnamese and Vietcong in military and propaganda capacities. In 1968, a communist defector told an Air Force Intelligence official in South Vietnam of an African-American serviceman who defected to the VC. This defector assisted the VC in marksmanship, tactics, and helping the VC 303rd Battalion plan their attacks. One captured communist charged that US defectors to the VC were sent into contested areas to turn villagers against the US by raping and killing civilians. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) received a total of 150 reports on defectors to the VC who were engaged in propaganda for the communists. In one South Vietnamese VC camp, the Defense Department reported that 18 foreign POWs were being brainwashed, including Americans, South Koreans, and Filipinos. The report noted *"After peace comes to Vietnam and the nation is unified the POWs will be allowed to return to their homes where they will become active in the communist party."*²³ A captured US Air Cavalry private with the initial "L" and whose second name began possibly with the letter "A" was observed on several occasions writing propaganda leaflets for the Viet Cong. "Progressives" who had been "brainwashed" were selected for counter-espionage operations. They were used to intercept American communications, monitor American radio broadcasts, and conduct propaganda. Others still were seen fighting with VC and North Vietnamese units.²⁴

Despite the "anti-fascist" image of the Viet Minh (and later the North Vietnamese), they also stooped to the low moral level of using the military and technical skills of Nazis and Japanese militarists for their battle against the French. Even worse, there were some reports that formerly ardent admirers of Hitler's National Socialism retained elite positions in North Vietnamese society. Tran Dai Nghia, the Vietnamese communist Chairman of State Commissions and the Vice President of Hanoi University Dr. Le Van Thiem were examples mentioned by P.J. Honey of many North Vietnamese "senior officials" who "actively supported Hitler."²⁵ In 1945, 1,500 to 4,000 Imperial Japanese officers and troops joined the Viet Minh. These ex-Japanese forces were led by Lt. Col. Mukayama and included Kempetai military police officers. The Viet Minh built their first artillery units around personnel from the old Japanese 51st Mountain Artillery Regiment. Former Nazi officials and Wehrmacht soldiers also served with the Viet Minh in their war against the French and their Vietnamese allies.²⁶ In 1951, it was reported that former German Luftwaffe and SS officers to serve with the communist Viet Minh forces. A former Luftwaffe officer in West Germany supervised the recruitment of former Luftwaffe and SS officers and he reported to the Viet Minh representative in East Germany Wang Chiang-Cha. Czech highway engineers and German mechanics and engineers were also recruited by the former Luftwaffe officer for service with the Viet Minh. The German and Czech volunteers were sent to the Viet Minh-occupied zones through the Soviet Union and Sinkiang Province in China to northern Indochina. The German SS officers were ordered to join the French Foreign Legion and then to desert immediately to the Viet Minh once they arrived in

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²³ Sauter, Mark and Sanders, Jim. The Men We Left Behind (National Pr Books: 1993) page 232.

²⁴ Cawthorne, Nigel. Bamboo Cage (SPI Books: New York NY 1991) page 24.

²⁵ McDonald, Congressman Lawrence P. "Hanoi Prepares a Bloodbath" Congressional Record April 21, 1975 page 11121.

²⁶ Nofi, Albert A. and Dunnigan, James F. Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War (St. Martin's Press: New York) pages 38-39.

Indochina. One such defector, an SS major, worked with other German Nazis who served as Ho Chi Minh's bodyguard force.²⁷ Some Pathet Lao leaders collaborated with the Japanese such as Phay Dang and Phoumi Vongvichit.²⁸

North Vietnam also became a hub for international revolutionary and terrorist cadres. They were conscious of their role in exporting world revolution as a part of the international communist empire. As early as 1962, Western intelligence services reported that they captured documents indicating that North Vietnamese agents provided advice to communist terrorists in Portuguese Guinea and Kwiliu Province in the Congo. It was also reported that PLO terrorists received training in North Vietnam.²⁹ The North Vietnamese *Dac Cong* (Special Tasks) trained the Indonesian Army Airborne units (RPKAD) in 1964 near Xuan Mai in North Vietnam (DRV).³⁰ A special North Vietnamese army unit was formed in 1955 and 1956 which contained 300 French, Algerian, and Moroccan POWs. Some were pro-communists while others stayed and married Vietnamese wives.³¹

South Vietnamese society was also targeted by “*active measures*” propaganda campaigns. Such measures included manipulation of South Vietnamese officials and military leaders and fomenting division within all levels of society. In April 1955, Ho Chi Minh wrote in *Pravda* that “*our struggle shifts now from the stage of armistice to that of political struggle... The present political struggle is only a stage in our national democratic revolution.*” A captured VC document noted that “*After the armistice the peace movement in the Saigon and Cholon area was very active.*”³²

The North Vietnamese governmental defector Dr. Dang Tan noted that “*...the People's Democratic Peace Front is just a plot of the communists. The VC is organizing the mass organizations through which to influence a large majority of the people. In proposing a coalition government, the communists hope to gain power legally... In addition the communists are preparing to surface overt offices which will serve as a screen behind which the party committees will be hidden and continue to operate.*”³³

General Lu Mong Lan of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) General Staff recalled that “*...the enemy was infiltrating our society at the highest level. Sometimes students speaking*

²⁷ “Eastern Germany: Viet-Minh Reporting Recruiting Secretly In Eastern Germany” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute Accessed From:

http://storage.osaarchivum.org/low/62/53/6253354a-3dca-4d3d-8ea4-c1748fcf4368_1.pdf

²⁸ Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. *Tragic Mountains* (Indiana University Press 1993) page 21.

²⁹ Greig, Ian. *Subversion* (Tom Stacey, 1973) pages 152-153.

³⁰ Akhmad Bukhari Saleh. “Jakarta Axis” August 12, 2002 Accessed From: <http://www.mail-archive.com/yonsatu@mahawarman.net/msg01473.html>

³¹ Jensen, Holger. “Frenchmen Aid Hanoi Defector” May 1, 1971 Accessed From:

<http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?AiM6FiWKkhc3ABvUVWDI3F6XtKUGVzG6cUG@xYrOvrPJ6OMBkYNjh1EODeIXOhWRY2.Yke7FtvbCVjOuPzhLitF9yXHWZbST4JeEntommr4/11271611010.pdf>

³² Turner, Robert F. *Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1975) page 173.

³³ Dang Tan. “A Red Defector Speaks Out” July 1971 Accessed From:

<http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?NOEHc4mMGCwhdSjajenhcMo13UnEjFHkdiEHKRzry6mmLeIRsrUsoi0X6j0ciOPXBQPTuZoVCTJvgXv0pdoDSTUtlusF09NtR3jToVix678/2311711023.pdf>

English would approach GIs at beaches like Nha Trang and talk about politics. They would denounce the Diem regime and couch their arguments in terms that would sway Americans who were naïve to the whole situation in Vietnam and isolated from the Vietnamese society because they could not speak the language. The first person who would communicate with these Americans was a pre-positioned VC underground agent claiming to be an ordinary student.”³⁴

In September 1972, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the North Vietnamese Army General-Lieutenant Chan Van Quang (Tran Van Quang), outlined at the Vietnamese Workers Party Politburo session *“the measures which are being carried out by the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in South Vietnam to develop opportunities for cooperation with and for the recruitment of representatives of the Saigon government and army to the side of the Patriots. With this in mind, contacts have been established and meetings conducted with several civilian and military leaders, to include generals Ngo Din Dzu (Commander, 2nd regional Corps), Nguyen Khanh and Zyong Van Min (former leader of the Saigon administration), Khoang Suan Lam (former Commander, 1st Regional Corps) and others. The meetings and contacts which we initiated were conducted with complete equality of rights and helped us recruit representatives of all strata of South Vietnamese society to our side. This is our grandest victory, won in the course of these contacts with the aim of resolving the Vietnamese issue. Thus, thanks to these contacts we understand which part of the population considers the course we are taking to be just i.e. we have exposed all of those who are against Nixon’s politics for the prolongation of the war, against Nguyen Van Thieu’s clique, and will join with us in the creation of a coalition government.”* Quang noted that *“The political views of puppet army officers captain and above are very reactionary.”*

ARVN General Khoang Suan Lam was cited by General-Lieutenant Quang as a *“very reactionary man... (who) came out against our revolution.”* Quang noted that Lam had a secret meeting with PAVN officials. According to Quang, Lam stated to the PAVN that *“...the Saigon puppet army will not be able to carry out missions, led by the plan of the ‘Vietnamization’ of its forces...the revolutionary forces will gain the victory and that the puppet army will not be able to stop it. The pace must be increased to realize this plan. We have to quickly throw these people from North to South Vietnam in order to destroy a large amount of the enemy’s kinetic energy from within.”* Quang also noted that *“We must attract the neutral forces to our side; those who are fighting for national independence; against the USA; forces who earlier fought against the regime of Ngo Din Dhiem and now fight against the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu. We must do everything necessary in order to successfully carry out the ‘Ba Be’ plan.”* Quang summarized the North Vietnamese political warfare strategy (the Ba Be Plan) directed at South Vietnam in this fashion: *“The goal of Plan ‘BA BE’ is introduction of division into the ranks of the enemy and lowering of his will to resist. Successful implementation of Plan ‘BA BE’ will help us to attain successes at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam.”*³⁵

Many progressive leftist and communist elements in the United States were more than willing to assist communist forces on the path to military victory. During the Vietnam War, American New Leftists, along with the Old Left (the Communist Party USA and its fronts) played a major role in demoralizing elite and popular opinion concerning a willingness to

³⁴Santoli, Al. To Bear Any Burden (Indiana University Press 1999) page 118.

³⁵“Report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the VNA (Vietnamese People’s Army) General-Lieutenant Tran Van Quang at the Politburo Meeting of the Tsk PTV” (Moscow 1972) Accessed From: <http://www.aiipowmia.com/sea/quang.html>

prosecute the Vietnam War. One of element of the North Vietnamese Army's Political Dau Tranh or political warfare was called Dich Van. Dich Van stipulated the implementation of a massive demoralization/disinformation program to *"sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and disloyalty among enemy's population."*³⁶ This program was carried out by Hanoi and its communist allies through the manipulation and funding so-called peace movements and communist fronts, the duping of Western journalists, and other methods of political warfare. These measures were intended to turn public opinion against South Vietnam and its Western allies and force a withdrawal of military and economic support for the Saigon regime. The Information and Press Departments of the North Vietnamese government issued permits for foreign journalists, television crews, leftist, pacifists, communists, and other antiwar delegations on visitations to Hanoi. Americans were divided by the North Vietnamese communist planners into *"ruling circles"* and *"good"* Americans. Hence, the Communists sought to split the American masses and intellectuals from their leaders. Foreigners were billeted at the well-appointed, formerly French-owned Metropole Hotel in Hanoi.³⁷

Early on, the North Vietnamese and their Vietcong allies recognized the role played by leftist-progressive, antiwar, and pacifist movements in undermining the American war effort in South Vietnam. The communists sought to manipulate these movements in order to pressure the elites in the United States to withdraw troops and abandon all assistance to the non-communist governments in South Vietnam. In December 1963, the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the ruling Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) noted *"...we must step our diplomatic struggles for the purposes of isolating warmongers, gaining the sympathy of antiwar groups in the US and taking full advantage of the dissensions among the imperialists to gain the sympathy and support of various countries which follow a peaceful and neutral policy."*

The 4th Congress of the Vietcong (VC) Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in March 1966 noted that *"...the more the American imperialists will be isolated from the rest of the world and even from their own people, the stronger will be the antiwar movement in the world and in the US and the better the opportunity for the other imperialist nations to take advantage and seize the interests of the US in many areas of the world."*

A captured document of a VC Party cadre noted that *"Within the United States public opinion is fervently demanding the end of aggressive warfare in South Vietnam. With this it can develop into a special victory for us."* The 9th Conference of the VC COSVN in July 1969 noted that the internal contradictions *"between the US rulers and...the American people"* were in its view *"the greatest weak point of the Americans at this time."*

Lt General Nguyen Van Vinh, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army and head of the ruling Vietnamese Workers Party Unification Board, noted to the 4th Congress of the COSVN *"Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front with a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal contradictions, and thereby making him more isolated in order to deprive him of propaganda weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who misunderstood the Americans clearly see their nature..."* A captured VC cadre notebook from late 1967 noted that *"Our*

³⁶ "Viet Cong and PAVN Strategy, Organization and Structure" Accessed From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viet_Cong_and_PAVN_strategy,_organization_and_structure

³⁷ Salisbury, Harrison. "Hanoi Inviting Westerners to Inspect Bomb Damage" New York Times January 11, 1967 page 1.

efforts will then be devoted to the isolation of the US and acquisition of the sympathy of the countries of the world.”³⁸

The Viet Cong document titled Circular on Antiwar Movements in the US noted that *“The spontaneous antiwar movements in the US have received assistance and guidance from the friendly (VC/NVN) delegations at the Paris Peace Talks.*”³⁹

The COSVN Subcommittee on Foreign Activities prepared a Report on Propaganda and Foreign Affairs in June 1966 which stated *“In capitalist countries, such as the United States, we always keep abreast of the American people’s opinions and try to motivate youths, intellectuals and religious sects to protest the war of aggression waged by their government in Vietnam. At the same time, we motivate families of the US troops dispatched to Vietnam to protest the sending of troops...Make every effort to persuade the people of America and its satellites to support us, to oppose the US Government’s aggressive policy, and to exploit the anti-war spirit of American and satellite soldiers in the South...Motivate the American people against the (US) crimes, and request an end to the war of aggression in South Vietnam. Every effort should be made to motivate soldiers’ dependents to launch anti-war demonstrations...”*

The document noted further that the VC and North Vietnamese needed to *“Isolate the Americans and their lackeys...”* The document also noted that *“Make every effort to persuade the people of America and its satellites to support us, to oppose the US Government’s aggressive policy, and to exploit the anti-war spirit of American and satellite soldiers in the South...”*⁴⁰ The North Vietnamese Ambassador Xuan Thuy called for the *“progressive American people and all antiwar organizations to unite closely.”*⁴¹

North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong noted in 1970 in Hanoi that *“The Vietnamese people are sincerely grateful for the warm sympathy and very effective support given them by...the peace-and democracy-loving people of the world, including the progressive people of the United States.”*⁴²

Nguyen Khac Vien, a North Vietnamese propagandist told an imprisoned future Admiral Stockdale that: *“Our country has no capability to defeat you on the battlefield. But war is not decided by weapons so much as national will... We will win this war on the streets of New York.”*⁴³

Pham Van Dong noted in a 1970 speech that *“Contradictions among the US ruling circles have become acute in regard to many domestic as well as foreign policies, chiefly the Viet Nam and Indochina problems. Many influential political and economic circles and many well-*

³⁸ Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1975) pages 235-249.

³⁹ Lipscomb, Thomas. “Hanoi Approved Of Role Played By Anti-War Vets” The New York Sun October 26, 2004 page 1.

⁴⁰ Rothrock, James. Divided We Fall: How Disunity Leads to Defeat (Authorhouse 2006) pages 7-8.

⁴¹ Powell, S. Steven. Covert Cadre (Green Hill, University of Michigan 1987) page 42.

⁴² Pham Van Dong. Twenty-Five Years of National Struggle and Construction (Foreign Languages Publishing House: Hanoi 1970) page 64.

⁴³ Hirsch, James S. Two Souls Indivisible: The Friendship That Saved Two POWs in Vietnam (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005) page 36.

known figures in both houses of the US Congress have used all in their power to oppose the Vietnamization of the war."⁴⁴

In 1975, the North Vietnamese journal Hoc Tap noted in an article by Truong Chi Cuong that the "*internal ranks of the United States are seriously divided*" and that the US was reeling from the effects of inflation and recession.⁴⁵

The North Vietnamese, along with their Soviet and international communist allies, actively participated in the destruction of American morale during the Vietnam War. Funds in hard currency, propaganda, and international solidarity conferences all were examples of the tangible forms of support that the USSR, China, Cuba, and the Warsaw Pact provided to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. Such support enabled the North Vietnamese to undermine the popular will for the United States to prosecute the war on behalf of our Indochinese allies. French intelligence reported that the USSR remitted hard currency to North Vietnam under the guise of economic aid, which was then transmitted to the antiwar movement. Over \$1 million in "*peace contributions*" was sent to the antiwar groups via money disbursed to Swiss and Swedish banks from the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and Allende's Chile. For ten years, the numbered account of the Skandinaviska Banken in Stockholm Sweden (#5210-10-045-34) was the repository of such funds. Indirect funding was sent via the Communist states to the 1970 Stockholm Conference on Vietnam and War Crimes Trials of Bertrand Russell.⁴⁶

The defecting Soviet GRU Colonel Stanislav Lunev revealed that the "*GRU had a massive presence in both North and South Vietnam; their operatives worked under the cover of the North Vietnamese Special Services Our instructors also told us about how the GRU influenced the American public. The GRU and KGB helped to fund just about every antiwar movement and organization in America and abroad. Funding was provided via undercover operatives or front organizations. These would fund another group that in turn would fund student organizations. The GRU also helped Vietnam organize its propaganda campaigns as a whole. What will be a great surprise to the American people is that the GRU and KGB had a larger budget for antiwar propaganda in the United States than it did for economic and military support for the Vietnamese. The antiwar propaganda cost the GRU more than \$1 billion, but as history shows, it was a hugely successful campaign and well worth the cost. The antiwar sentiment created an incredible momentum that greatly weakened the US military.*"⁴⁷

Despite certain sectarian, doctrinal differences, much of the American Left was united in the effort to assist the North Vietnamese and the VC on the material and political fronts. In testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Max Friedman noted that "*While there is a definite doctrinal split between the two major communist parties, CPUSA and SWP there is however unity in their efforts to weaken the will of the United States in resisting communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam.*"⁴⁸ Tom Hayden admitted when he wrote

103 Pham Van Dong. Twenty-Five Years of National Struggle and Construction (Foreign Languages Publishing House: Hanoi 1970) page 83.

⁴⁵ "Hoc Tap Shows How Congress Aided Hanoi" Human Events April 26, 1975 page 3.

⁴⁶ Warner, Denis Ashton. Certain Victory (Sheed Andrews and McMeel 1978) page 295.

⁴⁷ Lunev, Stanislav and Winkler, Ira. Through the Eyes of the Enemy (Regnery Publishers 1998) pages 72-79.

⁴⁸ Rothrock, James. Divided We Fall: How Disunity Leads to Defeat (Authorhouse 2006) page 81.

in Trail that the antiwar left “gave encouragement to the Vietnamese revolutionaries while demoralizing the American military and the puppets they supported.”⁴⁹

The CIA was not unaware of the negative power and influences the leftist/antiwar/pacifist movements played in slowly demoralizing the American war effort in South Vietnam. A CIA Intelligence Information Cable noted that “North Vietnamese morale has been boosted considerably by the Civil Rights and the ‘Black Power’ movement in the United States. The North Vietnam government has indicated to the French Mission in Hanoi that the riots and the emergence of the ‘Black Power’ movement signal the beginning of a popular revolution in the United States against the ruling classes. The North Vietnamese government also believes that the Civil Rights disturbances will adversely affect American participation in the Vietnam War. The United States government will be forced to divert large sums of money to educational, housing, and other social reforms to maintain the loyalty of the underprivileged elements and prevent them from joining the ranks of the Civil Rights dissidents. The North Vietnamese further believe that the United States will have to maintain more troops in the United States to control the rioters. The North Vietnamese government has also indicated that it expects the ‘Black Power’ movement to spread in perhaps two or three years to the American military establishment. Within that time span the North Vietnamese expect the American forces in Vietnam to be seriously weakened by racial tensions which might possibly result in actual clashes between the Negro and white troops.”⁵⁰

High-ranking defectors from the VC and North Vietnam admitted the central role of propaganda and disinformation in forcing an American withdrawal from Indochina. Some of the top communist officials from the North even bragged of their success in duping Western liberals and journalists. The reality of the hard-line Stalinist murderers and militarists in North Vietnam were transformed into the image of patriotic liberators and crusaders for social justice by many American liberals, leftists, and journalists. Former Vietcong Minister for Justice Truong Nhu Tang stated: “We had been preparing for the Tet Offensive since 1966 to create pressure and to help the anti-war movement in the United States. We needed to deliver a dramatic blow so that public opinion in the world and the United States would turn against the American government. After pointing out that over half their fighting forces were wiped out in the Tet Offensive, he continued: I believe that the Americans at Tet did not sustain great losses of human lives, but from the political point of view it was a very heavy blow for President Johnson’s government....So what we lost on the military front we won on the diplomatic and psychological fronts. Above all on the fourth front--the mass media, the press, television and the liberals in the United States.”⁵¹

Tang recollected that “Another section of the NLF was responsible for working with groups in the West opposed to the war and Western media to weaken the resolve of the American government.” He also noted “In South Vietnam religious organizations like Buddhists or Catholic, protested against the regime. But behind them were always some political activists who

⁴⁹ Ibid, page 94.

⁵⁰ Central Intelligence Agency. “Comments on the Effect of Food Shortages, Bombing Raids and the American Race Riots on North Vietnamese Morale” August 28, 1967 Date Declassified: September 20, 1979 Accessed From:

http://www.aavw.org/served/racetensions_riots_abstract01.html

⁵¹ “How Not to Win a War” AIM Report February A 1991 Accessed From:

http://www.aim.org/publications/aim_report/1991/02a.html

were communists. This is a tactic we call 'the watermelon' -green on the outside and red on the inside. These tactics were used in South Vietnam before 1975. This is a tactic of the Soviet bloc for propaganda against the Free World."⁵²

Tang also recalled that the American media and antiwar groups worked "to weaken the resolve of the American government. And the American media is easily open to suggestion and false information given by communist agents. The society is completely hypnotized by the media. (For example Pham Xuan An manipulated several important American reporters in Vietnam for years. Today An is a high ranking intelligence officer in communist intelligence in Ho Chi Minh City)." Pham Xuan An was also a high-ranking North Vietnamese intelligence officer during the war and later served in the Vietnamese Mission to the United Nations (UN) in New York in the post-1975 period.⁵³

Stephen Young, a Minnesota attorney and human rights activist interviewed Colonel Bui Tin, who served on the General Staff of the North Vietnamese Army and became editor of the People's Daily of the Vietnamese army. Colonel Tin noted that "*Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda, and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses. We were elated when Jane Fonda, wearing a red Vietnamese dress, said at a press conference that she was ashamed of American actions in the war and that she would struggle along with us.*"⁵⁴

Colonel Tin also noted that American antiwar leftists were "essential to our strategy. Support for the war from our rear was completely secure while the American rear was vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American anti-war movement. Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda and former Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses... Those people represented the conscience of America. The conscience of America was part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest, it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win."⁵⁵

Even well after the collapse and conquest of South Vietnam in April 1975, the Vietnamese Communists were forever grateful to their American leftist allies for their propaganda support. Many elements of the American Left continued to express their amicable feelings for the ruling communists in Hanoi. In April 1985, Dave Dellinger and American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) official John McAuliffe attended the massive military parade of Vietnamese troops commemorating the collapse and surrender of South Vietnam.⁵⁶ In April 1985, Mai Chi Tho, Chairman of the Peoples Committee of Ho Chi Minh City, noted at

⁵² Santoli, Al. To Bear Any Burden (Indiana University Press: Bloomington Indiana 1999) page 166.

⁵³ "How Reds Influence the Media" Human Events July 6, 1985 page 3.

⁵⁴ "Bui Tin Interviewed by Stephen Young How North Vietnam Won The War" Wall Street Journal August 3, 1995 Accessed From: <http://www.viet-myths.net/BuiTin.htm>

⁵⁵ Holzer, Henry Mark and Holzer, Erika. Aid and Comfort: Jane Fonda in North Vietnam (McFarland & Co., 2002) page 80.

⁵⁶ "Ho Chi Minh City Marks Liberation Anniversary and May Day" Vietnam News Agency May 1, 1985

this parade that *“This victory was achieved by our people at great sacrifice... When we fought the Americans, we received assistance from the American people.”*⁵⁷

Liberal and left-wing American journalists were notorious in allowing themselves to be manipulated by the VC and North Vietnamese into either providing outright support for the communist cause or overly magnifying the alleged sins of American and its allies, while ignoring the crimes of Hanoi. At first, the North Vietnamese were hesitant in reaching out to liberal American journalists. Mieczyslaw Maneli, a Polish Member of the International Control Commission (ICC), was impressed by the hostility expressed by the American journalists Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam towards the US Embassy and Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Maneli urged Pham Van Dong to grant Sheehan and Halberstam visas to enter North Vietnam. However, the communists turned that idea down, stating *“we are not interested in building up the prestige of American journalists.”*⁵⁸ By the mid-1960s, Hanoi had a change of heart. Intelligent and articulate English-speaking VC and North Vietnamese agents influenced American journalists who were lodged in the luxurious Caravelle and Continental Hotels in Saigon. These communist agents would chat with the American journalists and provide false stories to the newsmen who rarely ventured outside their hotels.⁵⁹ The British historian of Vietnamese Communism P.J. Honey commented that *“Reading the Hanoi papers you would think that the only Senator in the US is Wayne Morse and the only columnist Walter Lippmann. They offer all this as proof that their cause will succeed.”*⁶⁰ The formerly pro-Hanoi French leftist journalist Jean Lacouture confessed that he was sorry that his articles and reporting in Vietnam *“...contributed to the installation of one of the most repressive regimes history has ever known.”* Lacouture noted that he and other liberal journalists served as *“intermediaries for a lying and criminal propaganda - ingenuous spokesmen for tyranny in the name of liberty...I conducted myself as a militant, sympathetic to their cause and concealed the Stalinist aspect of their system, of which I was well aware.”*⁶¹

The Pathet Lao also followed a similar strategy of the North Vietnamese in co-opting Western leftists to boost the image of its communist regime in the court of world public opinion. By 1980, the ruling Pathet Lao government used Westerners to convince world public opinion that the postwar concentration camps were closed by late 1980. An American professor Dr. MacAlister Brown gave a lecture in Thailand that indicated he was told by Laotian ministry officials that the communist concentration camps were closed. The Mennonite and American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) were the only private religious groups from the United States that were allowed to conduct outreach efforts in Laos. One Mennonite official named Frederick Swartzendruber served in Laos from 1979-1981. He was given guided tours of the country aboard Soviet helicopters. Swartzendruber advanced the theory that the damages and deaths caused by the yellow rain chemical weapons dropped by Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops were simply the result of the proliferation of *“bee feces.”* Swartzendruber also

⁵⁷ Anderson, Paul. “Vietnamese Leader Credits Americans in Fall of Saigon” United Press International April 28, 1985

⁵⁸ Langguth, A.J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975 (Simon & Schuster: New York 2000) page 243.

⁵⁹ Harrison, Benjamin L. Hell on a Hill Top (iUniverse Inc 2004)

⁶⁰ Budenz, Louis. The Bolshevik Invasion of the West (Bookmailer, 1966) page 155.

⁶¹ Jasper, William F. “Seven Myths About the Vietnam War” The New American March 25, 2002 Accessed From: <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1021097/posts>

participated in tours of alleged Hmong markets, where people were supposedly shopping. American antiwar activists denounced the anti-Pathet Lao Hmong resistance led by former Royal Lao General Vang Pao. Vietnamese-trained Laotian agents trained were dispatched to the United States under the guise of political refugees. The INS allowed many of these agents into the United States as a result of a sloppy screening process. These Laotian agents also threatened former Royal Lao Army General Vang Pao with untraceable poisoning and other death threats. One refugee Thao Yia expressed his concerns about Pathet Lao infiltration of the United States: *"I'm worried that American 'Reds' and the US will make relations with Laos so we can't take back Laos. I see Red Lao who come here as refugees. In Fresno I see Red Lao come here to visit sent by the Lao government to tell the refugees propaganda. They also collect money from refugees here saying they'll take it to their families in Laos. They are only here to make money for themselves. There were four Red Hmong in Fresno last week. These Red Hmong and Red Lao start rumors in California to cause problems for Hmong living in America."* The US Committee on Refugees and the Mennonites blamed the Hmong resistance for the violence and atrocities in Laos at a human rights conference with the Laotian charge d' affaires to the United States present. A State Department official and the Laotian charge d' affaires traveled to this conference together. This illustrated the fact that the Bush Administration also helped to collude with American leftists and the Pathet Lao in covering up communist atrocities.⁶²

The Khmer Rouge also praised the role of the antiwar Left in assisting in their seizure of power in April 1975. The peace movement and the New Left played a critical role in pressuring Congress and the Ford Administration in reducing and eliminating American aid for the Lon Nol government. In September 1975, the Khmer Rouge Foreign Minister Ieng Sary visited New York City and met with American leftists and antiwar activists. Sary commented that the Khmer Rouge *"always remembered that the American people were supporting us."* He stated *"This victory is not the victory of the Cambodian people alone, it is the victory of all the people, the American people included-especially the American youth and the people that love peace and justice."* Sary stated *"The Cambodian people know you very well, especially students who are fighting on our behalf, especially your students at Jackson state and Kent State...we always remembered the American people as friends, and especially the people of New York City."*⁶³ Historian Sophal Ear noted that the pro-Hanoi and pro-Khmer Rouge Indochina Resource Center was *"the Khmer Rouge's most effective apologists in the West."* By 1978, the Chinese launched a propaganda campaign to defend the Democratic Kampuchea regime and distributed films such as Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward and printed glossy magazines. When Foreign Minister Ieng Sary traveled to New York in 1978, he hosted a viewing of the film Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward and distributed the glossy propaganda magazines.⁶⁴

Vietnamese Senior General Van Tien Dung wrote an article in the Army newspaper Nhan Dan titled the Great Spring Victory in April 1976. General Dung described the South Vietnamese forces as being weakened to the point where the North Vietnamese forces was

⁶²Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains (Indiana University Press 1993) pages 448-449 and 502-503.

⁶³ "Address by Mr. Ieng Sary" September 6, 1975 on Indochina Resource Center Letter Head Accessed From: <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?eKnmuFLMs0BEHzdQSHSWJL9TFpaRTIjB04Ae.apzZ@yApeOvZ1QJRKKeitDCRTg5ObPAOf4IYbmFJBdPDGKsWpY9UQjFtbJ6it706BGseps/2430803022.pdf>

⁶⁴ Maguire, Peter. Facing Death in Cambodia (Columbia University Press 2013) page 55.

“altogether superior” and as being *“passive and utterly weakened”* by late 1974. According to General Dung, the reduction of US aid forced the ARVN to *“fight a poor man’s war.”* General Dung noted that *“Enemy firepower had decreased by nearly 60 percent because of bomb and ammunition shortages ... its mobility was also reduced by half due to the lack of aircraft, vehicles, and fuel.”* In October 1974, the Vietnamese Workers’ Party Politburo and Central Committee determined that the US could not assist South Vietnam due to *“the internal contradictions within US administration and among US political parties...”* The North Vietnamese later revealed that the purpose of the Paris Agreement was to *“get the Americans out and gain time to make preparations to overthrow the GVN which had been forced to concede its heretofore ‘basic requirement’-the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam.”* By September 1973, eight months after the Paris Agreement, the North Vietnamese sent an additional 140,000 tons of weapons and 100,000 additional troops to the communist-held zones in South Vietnam.⁶⁵ In the first two months after the Paris Peace Accords (1973), more than 30,000 North Vietnamese personnel were infiltrated into South Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. By late 1973, 70,000 North Vietnamese troops infiltrated illegally and in early 1975, the number increased to 170,000. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was converted into a four lane hard top superhighway. During 1973, the North Vietnamese constructed 12 airfields in the South, installed SA-2 SAMs in Khe Sanh, and built an oil pipeline in the western part of their occupation zones in South Vietnam. Polish and Hungarian ICC officials sabotaged Canadian efforts to bring North Vietnamese violations of the Paris Peace Accords to light. In March 1973, the VC/North Vietnamese Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) issued a top secret document that stated that Hanoi needed to exploit the Paris Peace Accords as *“an additional sharp weapon with which to attack the enemy.”* VC cadres were instructed to *“develop the new assault posture”* and *“to launch continuous attacks to demand the enemy implement the Cease-Fire Agreement strictly.”* COSVN announced that the Paris Peace Accords must not be considered a replacement for *“the other types of struggle”* and warned that *“the ratio of forces is actually the decisive factor.”* COSVN emphasized that *“We must use national concord...to aim a sharp point at our enemies.”*⁶⁶

When the North Vietnamese invaded and defeated South Vietnam, the communists conditioned the conquered population to accept a fall in their material living standards. Top Vietnamese Communist leader Le Duan noted *“Those people in the south who, as a result of the U.S. imperialist war of aggression, had attained a living standard much too high for the country’s economy and their own working capacity, should understand that this prosperity was a sham one was misery and death for millions of their countrymen, destruction for innumerable villages and towns, degradation for many young people and humiliation for countless women in areas under enemy occupation, and enslavement of the country. They should know that the frantic needs and vulgar tastes of that ‘consumer society’ are the complete opposite of a truly happy and civilized life. Such people today can and should come back to reality and the life of the nation, and live by their work. This is the way to a happy, beautiful life with meaning and dignity, a life of true and lasting happiness for themselves and their children.”*⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Rothrock, James. Divided We Fall (AuthorHouse, 2006) pages 73-75.

⁶⁶ Nash, George H. “Dissolution of the Paris Peace Accords” National Review October 24, 1975

⁶⁷ Duan, Le. This Nation and Socialism are One: Selected Writings of Le Duan (Vanguard Books, 1976) page 186.

Much of the wealth and goods of South Vietnam were pillaged by the North Vietnamese administrators and officers and sent back to the North. Hence, the North Vietnamese conquered and pacified the South with an exploitative streak similar to the old Western colonialists and to Stalin's Red Army in the closing stages of World War II. Soviet military forces traveled on the heels of the North Vietnamese Army as South Vietnam collapsed in 1975. The Soviets inspected radar facilities captured by the North Vietnamese Army before the fall of Saigon. Within hours of the capture of Da Nang in April 1975 by the North Vietnamese Army, Soviet naval officers arrived to inspect the captured facilities. Within days, the Soviets restored the radar facilities.⁶⁸ In April 1975, when the North Vietnamese captured Saigon, they quickly captured the IBM computers which provided top secret data that identified the members of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam), policemen, CIO (Central Intelligence Organization) agents, and other members of the South Vietnamese military, intelligence, and law enforcement community. This was confirmed by North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung, the field commander during the conquest of South Vietnam.⁶⁹ In 1975, North Vietnam plundered South Vietnam and carted goods to Hanoi. Workers at the port in Saigon reported in 1975 that North Vietnamese ships and trucks were loaded with South Vietnamese cars, air conditioners, refrigerators, TVs, motor scooters, and other consumer goods. Weapons and Big John cranes were also removed. Broken naval and commercial vessels and armaments were repaired and then shipped north.⁷⁰ In November 1975, the International Store in Hanoi also sold captured US and Western-made consumer goods from South Vietnam, such as cosmetics, champagne, and whiskey.⁷¹

Another feature of the Vietnam War that was often covered up or denied by the US Government and the Left during the 1960s and 1970s was the involvement of a veritable international communist army of troops and advisers who assisted the North Vietnamese and VC forces who fought to conquer South Vietnam. One SDS questionnaire posed the following: "*The war in South Vietnam is supposed to be part of our policy to contain Communist Chinese aggression. How many Communist Chinese troops are actively engaged in combat in Vietnam?*" The answer provided by SDS was "*The correct answer is (A) None. Neither the U.S. Government or Saigon claim Communist Chinese troops are involved in the war.*"⁷² Hence, the American public was largely unaware of the massive, covert presence of military forces from the communist bloc countries in Indochina.

During the First Indochina War (1946-1954), the Viet Minh received Japanese-made rifles from Red China and the Soviet Union. The Japanese-made rifles that were sent by the USSR originated from captured stocks in Soviet-occupied Manchuria. The Viet Minh also smuggled weapons from Thailand and the Philippines. These arms were paid for by the sale of

⁶⁸ Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Westview Press, 1987) page 192.

⁶⁹ Hoar, William P. "The Human Coast of Betrayal" American Opinion October 1977 pages 77-83.

⁷⁰ "Situation in South Vietnam According to Refugees" November 1975 Accessed From: <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?WLgTM6I9oyGOoyaZXVSCGBFXN@4Oi21eHdLFBsGG6L.qI2pdPGAQLC XpTKD4GBleLInnJO9BaHgPMv09d6w5IYUv@A3X3qg9epjgDsH305A/2322511076.pdf>

⁷¹ "Hard Times for our Man in Hanoi" Times (London) November 26, 1975 page 26.

⁷² National Vietnam Examination Prepared By Students for a Democratic Society and Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy <http://www.sds-1960s.org/exam.htm> and <http://www.sds-1960s.org/answers.htm>

rice and opium produced in Viet Minh-occupied areas.⁷³ In March 1946, the Viet Minh provided the First Regiment of the Chinese Red Army with assistance such as food and medicine. The Viet Minh received training by the Chinese Red Army. By July 1947, 830 Viet Minh commanders and soldiers were trained by the Chinese Red Army. The Chinese Communist Party Hong Kong Sub-Bureau provided funds to the Viet Minh. In the spring of 1947, the Chinese Communists and Viet Minh established direct telegram communications links. US intelligence reported in 1946 that the Viet Minh government was in touch with the Soviets and Mao Tse-tung's headquarters. It was also reported in 1946 that the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet advisers trained Viet Minh troops.⁷⁴

In May 1989, the Red Chinese admitted that 300,000 People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops participated in fighting with the North Vietnamese and VC during the Vietnam War. Chinese officials noted that *"more than 4,000 Chinese soldiers were killed during the war."*⁷⁵ During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Red Chinese newspapers openly bragged that 20,000-30,000 PLA troops assisted the Viet Minh.⁷⁶

In July 1950, China sent 400 PLA soldiers to assist the Viet Minh. In August 1950, French intelligence reported that Viet Minh cadres received tank training in Canton China. In the mid-1950s, the North Vietnamese sent 202 soldiers to the USSR and China for armor training.⁷⁷ A military trade agreement was signed between the Viet Minh and China in January 1950. The Chinese provided the Viet Minh with 150,000 Japanese rifles and 10,000 US-made carbines. In mid-1951, 4,000-6,000 Chinese troops were assisting the Viet Minh. In early 1952, 7,000-8,000 Chinese troops helped the Viet Minh. In the siege of Dien Bien Phu, the Chinese and Soviets provided 100 105mm howitzers, several batteries of Katyusha multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and 180 antiaircraft guns. Chinese PLA drivers manned Soviet-made Molotova trucks and PLA laborers constructed roads along the attack routes.⁷⁸

The South Vietnamese complained to the International Control Commission (ICC) in August 1964 that Chinese advisers assisted the VC in its territory. The Chinese PLA reportedly led the VC 514th and 261st Battalions in an attack on Sung Hieu. In July 1966, South Vietnamese Special Forces captured VC documents in Tay Ninh Province. These documents revealed that the Chinese PLA fought with VC troops in South Vietnam. These documents were never made public in the US. In January 1973, a Pathet Lao defector reported that the Red

⁷³ Windrow, Martin. The French Indochina War 1946-54 (Osprey Publishing 2013) page 24.

⁷⁴ Zhai, Qiang. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (University of North Carolina Press, 2000) pages 12-13.

⁷⁵ Van Atta, Michael. "Seven New Areas That Were Classified In Kiss The Boys Goodbye" Nam Vet Newsletter December 14, 2000 Accessed From:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/vietnam/nvet_archive/nvet0412.txt

⁷⁶ McLean, Jim. "How Mao Tse-Tung Planned to Unleash Nuclear War in Vietnam" Scotland on Sunday March 15, 1998 page 7.

⁷⁷ Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing Limited 2012) page 45.

⁷⁸ Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1975) page 85.

Chinese stationed 700-800 PLA troops in communist-held sections of Laos.⁷⁹ Mao Tse-tung threatened to drop atomic bombs on Saigon and other South Vietnamese bases and cities if the United States used tactical nuclear weapons against North Vietnam. Mao's threat was made in the presence of PLA generals in the mid-1960s.⁸⁰

During the anti-French war of 1946-1954, Viet Minh commanders had a number of Soviet advisers attached their staffs. They oversaw logistics and advised on tactics. Two Soviet officers reportedly were killed in the Plain of Reeds and Ben Tre in 1951. Soviet officers also interrogated French POWs, with an emphasis on Foreign Legionaries. They also developed excellent propaganda into inducing them to defect.⁸¹ In 1957, Soviet officers served in North Vietnamese artillery and engineering schools.⁸² In 1954, the KGB established relations with the North Vietnam and a KGB Advisory Group arrived in Hanoi in 1958. The KGB established relations with the North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security, the North Vietnamese Army's Military Security Department, while the GRU established relations with the North Vietnamese Army General Staff's General Research Department.⁸³

A Diem-era South Vietnamese report indicated that the North Vietnamese hosted Soviet and Chinese military advisers in the DMZ. It also reported that the North Vietnamese imported training aircraft, MiG-15 jet fighters, Ilyushin and Antonov transport planes, helicopters, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and gunboats. After the 1954 Geneva Accord, the North Vietnamese established a unit of marines, self-defense forces at factories and farms, and the so-called Popular Security Army. In October 1959, it was reported that the North Vietnamese negotiated a military alliance with the USSR, China, and North Korea. In early 1960, the Soviets sent a military mission to North Vietnam to reinforce the military bases. North Vietnamese anti-aircraft weapons at Hoi-Xuan, Hanoi-Haiphong, and Hoi-Xuan-SonTay were supervised by Chinese PLA advisers.⁸⁴

In 1954 and 1955, the North Vietnamese expanded existing airfields. In 1956, North Vietnamese air force students were sent to Czechoslovakia and the USSR. By the end of 1956, Chinese advisers were also training future pilots in North Vietnam. By 1957, North Vietnamese pilots learned how to fly the MIG-15 in Soviet Air Force schools. By 1957, two new airfields were built in Cao Bang and Do Son. By 1958, the USSR sent to the North Vietnamese IL-14, Li-2 and AN-2 transports and Mi-4 helicopters. These aircraft were used by North Vietnam to supply the Pathet Lao. By 1959, at least 13 airfields existed in North Vietnam. In 1960, North Vietnam pilots went to China for training on MIG-17 fighters. By December 1960, an air bridge

⁷⁹ Silva, Luis. "Ho Chi Minh's Foreign Legion" Accessed From: <http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000018.htm>

⁸⁰ McLean, Jim. "How Mao Tse-Tung Planned to Unleash Nuclear War in Vietnam" Scotland on Sunday March 15, 1998 page 7.

⁸¹ Brown, F.C. "Soviet Cong: Ivan in Indochina" Soldier of Fortune November 1985 pages 70-74.

⁸² Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Westview Press, 1987)page 116.

⁸³ Harrison, Benjamin L. Hell on a Hill Top (iUniverse Inc 2004)

⁸⁴ Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists From July 1959 to June 1960 (Saigon 1960) Accessed From <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?YMaoFmISzf2U9Nojk@9L@usLXKXOyN69Mxn@ZCj@a98gCwt3DvvlLUZfp7vDr94hnUwyY@Nx1jAbT@fe6jEgGYaVj2C04ZxiYw2MXlcbhlE/2410403027.pdf>

was developed between the North Vietnam and Xam Nua airfield in Laos. This bridge was manned by Li-2 transports piloted by joint teams of North Vietnamese and Soviet pilots. By 1962, Soviet air force advisers left and the USSR provided MIG-17 and MIG-15 fighters.⁸⁵

In the early 1960s, South Vietnamese forces nearly captured a Soviet delegation touring VC-held territory in the eastern Mekong Delta in South Vietnam. Former US Ambassador to Laos William Sullivan reported that in 1961, the USSR stationed over 500 troops in Laos. In the fall of 1967, South Vietnamese Military Intelligence reported that VC regiments in Phouc Tuy Province were accompanied by advisers from Red China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and North Korea.⁸⁶

Two Soviet trawlers electronically equipped were stationed near the US Air Base in Guam (four miles offshore) and relayed data to the North Vietnamese. In 1969-1973, East Germany and Czechoslovakia provided 25% of the North Vietnamese army's war materials. From 1973-1975, the USSR provided the North Vietnamese with \$2.5 billion of war material.⁸⁷ In April 1989, the USSR admitted that it awarded Soviet officers who "*helped shoot down 24 US bombers.*" In 1970, VC defector Bui Con Tuong reported that in 1967, he accompanied a Soviet delegation that included a one star Red Army general and a captain to Kien Hoa in South Vietnam to inspect a "*liberated*" hamlet. This delegation was evacuated after a South Vietnamese and US attack in the area. In May 1965, communist defector Nguyen Van Ton revealed that he "*escorted Russians on military operations in War Zone C.*" In 1967, a US Navy SEAL killed a Soviet adviser in combat in the Kien Gia Province. In September 1969, defecting North Vietnamese official Dr. Dang Tan revealed that he personally saw Soviet advisers in South Vietnam and Laos that carried weapons. Dr. Tan was also in contact with 4 to 5 groups of foreign advisers from Cuba, Red China, the USSR, and North Korea.⁸⁸

In May 1965, a VC defector named Nguyen Van Ton stated that he worked with a Soviet officer, Ivan Esnot, who was involved in propaganda efforts and the Australian Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett. He also escorted a French collaborator with the VC, Madeleine Riffaud. Navy SEALs reportedly killed Soviet advisers in Kien Giang Province in 1967. Major Len Campbell also claimed hearing Soviet voice transmissions in Takeo Province in Cambodia.⁸⁹

In 1971, Soviet GRU/Spetsnaz operatives operated in South Vietnam. Soviets that were disguised as Americans also targeted the US Special Operations (SOG) forces, gauging their effectiveness. In 1969, Soviet-piloted Mi-6 helicopters reportedly transported troops and supplies in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. A VC defector reported that Soviet Navy submarines unloaded personnel and munitions along the South Vietnamese coast. Soviet troops operated with North Vietnamese troops in Camau in February 1973, at An Loc in November

⁸⁵Toperczer, Istvan. Air War Over North Vietnam (Squadron/Signal Publications 1998) pages 4-7.

⁸⁶Silva, Luis. "Ho Chi Minh's Foreign Legion" Accessed From: <http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000018.htm>

⁸⁷Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Westview Press, 1987) pages 121-125.

⁸⁸Colvin, Rod. First Heroes (Arden Media, 1987) pages 48-49.

⁸⁹Brown, F.C. "Soviet Cong: Ivan in Indochina" Soldier of Fortune November 1985 pages 70-74.

1973, and outside of Danang in February 1974.⁹⁰ One South Vietnamese officer noted in 1974 that he saw members of the Russian Engineering Corps bulldozing earth near a North Vietnamese manioc farm. This officer also witnessed Soviet personnel manning tanks attacking South Vietnamese forces at base 801 at Le Tanh.⁹¹

The Soviets also compromised the SOG groups by forming counter-raider teams that mimicked Americans and South Vietnamese troops in every fashion. They were first deployed in 1971 and operated in the tri-border region. Many bona fide SOG teams were compromised and defeated. These fake SOG teams also purchased A-1E aircraft, command helicopters, and UH-1Hs from Third World countries and international business concerns and transported to North Vietnam on Soviet and Eastern European freighters. The Soviet allegedly painted and marked the craft so well that they were indistinguishable from bona fide SOG aircraft. The fake SOG teams were believed to be either KGB or GRU. Soviet piloted Mi-6 and Mi-4 helicopters reportedly operated in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.⁹²

South Vietnamese security officials also claimed that KGB agents stirred up anti-US dissent in Saigon and disseminated disinformation. KGB officers worked underground in Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Macao.⁹³

A Pathet Lao defector indicated that Soviet liaison officers were attached to Pathet Lao HQ at Ban Na Kay Neua. He also reported that large Soviet helicopters were manned by Soviets who flew between Hanoi and Sam Neua. Soviet forces were also sighted Camau (February 1973), An Loc (November 1973), and the foothills west of Danang (January/February 1974).⁹⁴

Reportedly, ex-French Foreign Legionnaires joined the Viet Minh as advisers. A French unit called the "*International Combatants*" also fought with the Viet Minh and even serves as spies who disguised themselves as US news correspondents. Former North Vietnamese Defense Ministry official Dr. Dang Tan reported that French military advisers assisted the VC and North Vietnamese. It was believed that these Frenchmen assisted Hanoi in "*fighting imperialism*" as radical leftists or deserters from French colonial forces present in Indochina before 1954. Reportedly, Western leftists from The Netherlands, Australia, and the United States volunteered to fight with the VC and North Vietnamese well into the 1970s.⁹⁵

The East Germans stationed a National People's Army engineer battalion in Laos, while East Berlin's advisers assisted VC and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.⁹⁶ East Germany sent 200 troops to man missile and communications facilities. They were attached officially as a "*study group*" affiliated with the East German Embassy in Hanoi.⁹⁷ In the late

⁹⁰ Van Atta, Michael. "Seven New Areas That Were Classified In Kiss The Boys Goodbye" Nam Vet Newsletter December 14, 2000 Accessed From:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/vietnam/nvet_archive/nvet0412.txt

⁹¹ Colvin, Rod. First Heroes (Ardent Media, 1987) pages 48-49,

⁹² Brown, F.C. "Soviet Cong: Ivan in Indochina" Soldier of Fortune November 1985 pages 70-74.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Silva, Luis. "Ho Chi Minh's Foreign Legion" Accessed From:

<http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000018.htm>

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ "East German Aid to Hanoi Detailed" New York Times October 14, 1966 page 14.

1950s, the Stasi exported listening devices to North Vietnam for telephone and room surveillance. By the mid-1960s, the Stasi assisted the North Vietnamese in developing a modern technical department for Hanoi to combat *“USA Imperialism.”*

During the 1980s, the East Germans also provided the Vietnamese intelligence services with Western-made Ricoh and Robot cameras, a Swiss-made Aciera milling machine, and supplies for disguising agents.⁹⁸ In 1982, Lt-Col Helmut Foerster, Navy and Air Force Attaché at the East German Embassy in Vietnam, praised the co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries. He said that *“many infantry officers from the GDR had assisted the Vietnamese army in building the technical NCO school in Ho Chi Minh City and formulating its teaching and training programmes, while many Vietnamese officers had been sent to the GDR for long-term training to become lecturers and instructors in the Vietnamese army.”*⁹⁹

In April 1971, VC and NVA units in the Soi Ba Huyen area, near the Phu Cat Air Base were accompanied by five North Korean military advisers.¹⁰⁰ By December 1966, 25-50 North Korean pilots assisted the North Vietnamese in engaging US aircraft. North Korean soldiers and pilots continued to assist North Vietnam until April 1975. Communist Vietnam then transferred US-made weapons captured from South Vietnamese to their North Korean allies. Such equipment included M-113 APCs and M-48 tanks, which were transferred to North Korean special reconnaissance forces.¹⁰¹

In January 1973, 4,000 Cuban army engineers landed in Hanoi and commenced the reconstruction of the Phuc Yen/Da Phuc Airfield. Cuba also reportedly piloted MIG aircraft for the North Vietnamese and also accompanied Hanoi’s forces in the conquest of South Vietnam.¹⁰²

Soviet specialists selected a variety of advanced aircraft in Da Nang in November 1975. They included F-5s, A-37s, internal equipment of an AC-119, CH-47 helicopters, and UH-1 helicopters. The captured planes were then sent to the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for study and analysis by military engineers in those nations.¹⁰³ In 1979, the Soviets dispatched to ex-US naval base at Cam Ranh Bay various warships such as F class submarines. The Soviets reconstructed the former US facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and added on 7 piers. Between 1979 and 1984, the Soviets based Tu-95/Tu-142 Bear reconnaissance planes, Tu-16 Badger bombers, MIG-23 fighter/bombers, Ka-25 anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and Yak-36 V/STOL fighters. The Soviets also stationed several hundred naval infantrymen at Cam Ranh Bay.¹⁰⁴ General Van Tien Dung attended the West-81 Warsaw Pact exercises as a Vietnamese Army observation team in 1981. North Vietnamese officers took part in other Warsaw Pact war games. In 1984, a battalion of Soviet naval infantry staged amphibious landings along the central

⁹⁸ Macrakis, Kristie. *Seduced by Secrets* (Cambridge University Press 2008) Accessed From: <http://worldtracker.org/media/library/Intelligence%20&%20Espionage/Seduced%20by%20Secrets%20Inside%20the%20Stasi's%20Spy-Tech%20World.pdf>

⁹⁹ “GDR Military Attache On Co-Operation With Vietnam” *Hanoi Home Service* March 9, 1982

¹⁰⁰ Silva, Luis. “Ho Chi Minh’s Foreign Legion” Accessed From:

<http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000018.htm>

¹⁰¹ Bermudez, Joseph S. *Terrorism: The North Korean Connection* (Crane Russak 1990) page 166.

¹⁰² Bengel, Michael. “Cuban War Crimes Against American POWs During the Vietnam War”

October 4, 1999 Accessed From: <http://www.nationalalliance.org/cuba/benge4.htm>

¹⁰³ Toperczer, Istvan. *Air War Over North Vietnam* (Squadron/Signal Publications 1998) page 58.

¹⁰⁴ Smith, Frederic N. “Cam Ranh Bay Just an R and R Port?” *Defense & Foreign Affairs* April, 1988 page 37.

Vietnam coast 100 miles south of Haiphong. Nine Soviet naval vessels took part in this exercise.¹⁰⁵ After 1979, the KGB and GRU increased their relations with Vietnam. In mid-1980, the GRU cooperated with the Vietnamese Army Signals Intelligence units.¹⁰⁶

Perhaps some of the most prized items captured by the North Vietnamese were the American-made arms of the old South Vietnamese armed forces. Since some of the weapons were manufactured with high quality technologies, Hanoi's communist allies requested samples of the leftover US-made weapons. Other captured South Vietnamese arms were passed to North Vietnam's allies in the Third World and various "*national liberation*" (terrorist) movements throughout the world. A large number of these American-made armaments were also utilized in combat by the North Vietnamese against their erstwhile communist allies in Democratic Kampuchea and China.

The Soviets and Warsaw Pact sensed that they inherited a treasure trove of potentially advanced American weapons and requested samples from North Vietnam. Soviet specialists selected a variety of advanced aircraft in Da Nang in November 1975. They included F-5s, A-37s, internal equipment of an AC-119, CH-47 helicopters, and UH-1 helicopters.¹⁰⁷ By 1977, Poland and Czechoslovakia received sample A-37B and F-5E aircraft.¹⁰⁸ On May 30, 1975 two new regiments of the North Vietnamese Air Force was set up consisting of captured F-5s and A-37s. They were the 935th and 937th Regiments.¹⁰⁹ By 1979, reports indicated that the Vietnamese Air Force had captured US-made F-5 and A-37 fighter bombers, C-130, C-47, and C-7 transports, AC-119K gunship planes, and UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters.¹¹⁰

Clearly, these aircraft were quickly conscripted by the North Vietnamese in their occupation of South Vietnam and to engage in combat with their communist rivals in Democratic Kampuchea. By the end of 1975, captured C-130As were shuttling personnel and supplies between Saigon, Hanoi, and Vientiane (Laos).¹¹¹

In 1977, A-37B Dragonfly fighter-bombers attacked targets in Democratic Kampuchea.¹¹² In 1978, F-5 fighter bombers and A-37 jet light bombers were used by the PAVN to bomb Democratic Kampuchean positions, while C-130A transports launched pallet bombing missions at Stung Treng.¹¹³ In the early 1980s, the Vietnamese deployed captured American-made UH-1H Huey helicopters to assist their allies in the People's Republic of

¹⁰⁵ Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Westview Press, 1987) page 199.

¹⁰⁶ Harrison, Benjamin L. Hell on a Hill Top (iUniverse Inc 2004)

¹⁰⁷ Toperczer, Istvan. Air War Over North Vietnam (Squadron/Signal Publications 1998) pages 49 and 58.

¹⁰⁸ Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. Red Ladies in Waiting (Squadron/Signal Publications 1994) pages 46-48.

¹⁰⁹ Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. Red Ladies in Waiting (Squadron/Signal Publications 1994) pages 46-48.

¹¹⁰ "Vietnam Air Force: 1979" Air Forces Intelligence Study Directorate of Research DIA October 1, 1979 Accessed From: <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?2KZrLZwwQgcs4URjUTLedYzA7Q60DUNEeB3o177eMrU7Yrn8LOtZsFx5eKGqddPptkSOco.p7SI3CYMCv863RwAEL6OGpwiuNokOIdyWrs/2123309006.pdf>

¹¹¹ Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing 2012) page 49.

¹¹² Conboy, Kenneth. "How Vietnam's People's Army Achieved Regional Power With A Bankrupt State at Home" Defense & Foreign Affairs August, 1990 page 6.

¹¹³ Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing 2012) page 49.

Kampuchea.¹¹⁴ In 1979, US-made C-130 transport planes were utilized to airlift Vietnamese troops to northern Vietnam during the war with China.¹¹⁵

The North Vietnamese Navy acquired 1,300 mostly American-made South Vietnamese vessels, including Admiral-class corvettes. Some were conscripted into combat service with Hanoi's forces. These corvettes were later used in 1978 against the navy of Democratic Kampuchea.¹¹⁶

Throughout the early to mid-1980s, Hanoi still utilized albeit a dwindling number of serviceable US-made F-5 aircraft. One of the last known public appearances of captured US-made jets occurred when F-5 fighter bombers flew during the anniversary parade in 1985 that commemorated the fall of Saigon.¹¹⁷

Some reports indicated continued Vietnamese use of captured US aircraft even as late as the end of 1989. As of November 1989, old American-made F-5As and F-5Es were reportedly in storage at Vietnamese hangars, while some were still utilized as active combat aircraft. US-made transport planes and A-37B Dragonfly fighter-bombers saw continued use by the Vietnamese Air Force.¹¹⁸

Leftover American-made heavy weapons were also incorporated into the North Vietnamese Army. By July 1975, 25 US-made 105 mm howitzers were reportedly shipped from the occupied South Vietnamese territory to the port of Haiphong in North Vietnam. It was shipped in a former US-made South Vietnamese landing ship that was conscripted by the North Vietnamese navy. It was believed that the North Vietnamese was able to acquire ammunition and spare parts from Red China for the 105 mm howitzers.¹¹⁹ As of 1990, the Vietnamese actively utilized US-built M-113 armored personnel carriers that were retrofitted with Soviet-made engines.¹²⁰

There were attempts by Hanoi to procure spare parts for these captured weapons from corporations based in Hong Kong and Japan. After all, these were relatively high-performance weapons that added a higher quality to North Vietnamese firepower. In 1975, it was reported that Vietcong officials were meeting with Third World and European Communist buyers in Hong Kong to purchase captured American-made equipment. This business was conducted from the North Vietnamese trade office in the People's Bank of China office building in Hong Kong.¹²¹ North Vietnam also reportedly approached the Japanese looking for private firms to repair captured aircraft.¹²²

¹¹⁴ Conboy, Kenneth. "How Vietnam's People's Army Achieved Regional Power With A Bankrupt State at Home" Defense & Foreign Affairs August, 1990 page 6.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing 2012) page 51.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, page 49.

¹¹⁸ "Vietnam-Air Forces" Flight International November 29, 1989

¹¹⁹ "Captured US Arms Are heading for Hanoi" Evening Capital July 25, 1975 page 2.

¹²⁰ Conboy, Kenneth. "How Vietnam's People's Army Achieved Regional Power With A Bankrupt State at Home" Defense & Foreign Affairs August, 1990 page 6.

¹²¹ Hughes, Richard. "Captured US Arms to be Sold in Vietnam" Times (London) September 9, 1975 page 7.

¹²² Anderson, Jack. "US Weapons Left in Vietnam Turning Up Around the World" The Progress August 23, 1979 page 4.

The North Vietnamese also handed US air and naval infrastructure to the Soviets as military bases. As of November 1989, the Soviet Navy and Air Force retained the former US armed forces bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. Soviet Navy and Air Force units based at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay were equipped with Tu-95 Bear bombers, Il-38 reconnaissance aircraft, and Tu-26 Backfire bombers.¹²³

Other captured US firearms and weapons systems were provided to terrorist movements, communist parties, and ideological allies who also possessed vast stores of American-made weapons from the old governments displaced by Islamists and Communists. In 1977, the Soviets reportedly urged the communist Ethiopian military dictatorship to approach the Vietnamese for spare parts for American-made weapons. At that time, the Ethiopian army used predominantly US-built weapons.¹²⁴ Vietnam also shipped spare parts for captured American-built F-4 Phantom aircraft to Islamist Iran. These parts originated from captured South Vietnamese stocks at the old American airbase at Danang.¹²⁵ Starting in 1980, Vietnam shipped spare parts and arms from its US-made stocks to Iran.¹²⁶ Communist Vietnam then transferred US-made weapons captured from South Vietnam to their North Korean allies. Such equipment included M-113 APCs and M-48 tanks, which were transferred to North Korean special reconnaissance forces.¹²⁷ The North Koreans would then disguise themselves as South Korean forces and thus gain an advantage in a potential attack on the government in Seoul.

Hanoi also dumped vast stores of small arms and infantry weapons to communist movements and terrorists all over the world. In late December 1975, the North Vietnamese agreed to transfer to the USSR ten thousand captured American-made rifles and 10 million rounds of ammunition to be *“utilized for assistance in struggle with the imperialism and for providing aid to the national liberation movements.”*¹²⁸

Congressman Wolff (D-NY) reported in 1977 that some of the American weapons captured by the North Vietnamese in 1975 were transferred to Communist guerrillas fighting on the Thai-Malaysian border.¹²⁹ In 1980, US-made M-16 rifles were stockpiled in the Cuban Embassy in Jamaica for use by leftist Prime Minister Michael Manley’s leftist forces during a nation-wide election that year. A portion of these M-16s found in Jamaica had serial numbers that signified that they saw usage in South Vietnam by the ARVN and US forces.¹³⁰

In October 1980, the Cuban Military Attache in Vietnam visited one of the warehouses which stored captured American-made weapons that were being transferred to revolutionary forces all over the world. A declassified Vietnamese document noted that *“This visit to your unit is of special significance because all of the officers and enlisted men of the General Warehouse*

¹²³ “Vietnam-Air Forces” Flight International November 29, 1989

¹²⁴ “Conflict in the Horn of Africa” Heritage Foundation Report July 13, 1977 Accessed From: http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1977/pdf/bg24.pdf

¹²⁵ Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes (Palgrave Macmillan 1999) page 50.

¹²⁶ Hiro, Dilip. The Longest War (Psychology Press, 1989) pages 71-72.

¹²⁷ Bermudez, Joseph. Terrorism, the North Korean connection (Crane Russak, 1990) page 166.

¹²⁸ KGB report. Shipments of American weapons captured in Vietnam to the USSR December 31, 1975 Accessed From: http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/terr-wd/0915_gb75-1-Eng-ybz.pdf

¹²⁹ The Associated Press April 13, 1977

¹³⁰ United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. “Cuba’s Renewed Support of Violence in Latin America” December 14, 1981 Accessed From: <http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/guerrilla/report-90.htm>

have completed a task that, although relatively simple, is of tremendous significance for the success of the Asian and Latin American revolutions and for all peoples who have or are prepared to fight for their own permanent liberation."¹³¹

From August to October 1980, the Soviets, Cubans, and Vietnamese coordinated their efforts to send captured 60-80 tons of American-manufactured weapons to the Salvadoran FMLN rebel forces. The Soviet airline Aeroflot transported these firearms from Hanoi to Havana.¹³²

In June 1975, the North Vietnamese invited French experts to inspect leftover US-made IBM computers in Saigon. The French team reported that South Vietnamese had more computers than Thailand and Philippines combined.¹³³ The French Commercial Bank of Northern Europe aided the North Vietnamese in retrieving South Vietnamese assets in the United States and trained North Vietnamese banking officials in France.¹³⁴

After the conquest of South Vietnam in April 1975, the North Vietnamese sought to foment communist revolution in other Indochinese countries. North Vietnam provided massive assistance to the Pathet Lao in Laos in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Hanoi also provided troops and arms to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, who conquered that tormented country in April 1975.

In 1960, the Soviets established air connections with Laos at Vientiane Airport. Soviet copies of C-47 and Convair 240 transports delivered oil and weapons bound for Kong Le's neutralist forces. North Vietnamese artillery troops and 105 mm howitzers were unloaded from these planes and were destined for Pathet Lao and Kong Le forces. Chinese, Soviet, North Vietnamese, and Pathet Lao established military missions at Khang Khay and North Vietnam established "information offices" in Phong Savan. In December 1960 and January 1961, the USSR airlifted and dropped weapons in Pathet Lao areas 184 times. Chinese armed work crews constructed roads in northern Laos near the Chinese border and supplied weapons to the Pathet Lao.¹³⁵

Once the US commenced its withdrawal of troops from Indochina after the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, the communist forces redoubled their efforts to conquer Southeast Asia. In Laos, the anti-communist elements of the Royal Lao government were undermined by both the Americans and the communist Pathet Lao. Right-wing elements of the Royal Lao Army were rendered impotent by the US Embassy in Vientiane. Anti-communist opposition by the Royal Lao Army was quashed by US Embassy orders to cut off rice, oil, and money shipments. Royal

¹³¹ Military Attaché of the Cuban Embassy in Vietnam Visits General Warehouse 767 October 12, 1980 Accessed From: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/vietnam-covertly-supplied-weapons-to-revolutionaries-algeria-and-latin-america>

¹³² A request from leadership of the Communist Party of El Salvador. Shipment of 60-80 tons of Western-made small arms and ammunition from Hanoi to Havana for Communist Party of Salvador in September-October 1980. August 20, 1980 Accessed From: http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/terr-wd/0959_ct225b80-Eng-Sklyar.pdf

¹³³ Beech, Keyes. "US Legacy Aids Vietnam Economy" *The Calgary Herald* June 14, 1976 page 73.

¹³⁴ Gottesman, Evan. *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge* (Yale University Press, 2003) pages 121-122.

¹³⁵ Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. *Tragic Mountains* (Indiana University Press 1993) pages 84-86, 93, and 99-101.

Lao troops were attacked by Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese, and Red Chinese troops while placing cease-fire border markers. Royal Lao government troops were attacked by communist troops who manned mortars, grenades, and machine guns. Once the US withdrew from Laos in 1973 following the Vientiane Agreement, Soviet planes airlifted 1,000 Pathet Lao soldiers disguised as “*policemen*.” Red China airlifted other Pathet Lao forces to Luang Prabang. Neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma refused to have Royal Lao forces inspect Pathet Lao materials and personnel. This occurred despite the protocols of the Agreement stipulating inspections. All US and Thai soldiers withdrew by mid-1974. However, 40,000 North Vietnamese troops and advisers remained and fought alongside the Pathet Lao. One military adviser termed Souvanna Phouma “*naïve and his ego got in the way. He truly believed with his princely status his notion that he was so well liked by so many and his belief that he had the ability to work out something with his princely half-brother Souphanouvong he had reason to be confident about the future of Laos. He was wrong.*” In 1974, a Pathet Lao infantry battalion was allowed into Vientiane to protect its mission. Instead it engaged in propaganda and agitprop activities and destabilized the Royal Lao government. They stirred up strikes and demonstrations by university students who demanded that the government chart a socialist course. Capitalism and the US were denounced, along with the Royal Lao government. By mid-1974, strikes were conducted by traffic police and municipal workers in Vientiane. The disorder soon spread to other towns. By 1975, teachers joined the strikes. The non-communists in the Royal Government were denounced as incompetent and corrupt. In February 1975, Pathet Lao forces attacked government positions at Sala Phou Khoun with the aid of North Vietnamese troops. By March 1975, the Royal Lao government lodged 80 protests to the joint commission with no response. Pathet Lao demonstrators carried signs stating “*The War is Ended; the Meo Are Dead.*” In early 1975, demonstrations and strikes by teachers and civil servants continued with people carrying signs calling for “*popular uprisings,*” “*people’s seizure of power,*” “*purification,*” and the elimination of “*reactionaries,*” “*foreign consultants,*” and the National Assembly and the Constitution. Mobs struck the USIS and USAID offices and threatened US citizens. All Royal Lao Army commanders other than Gen. Vang Pao retreated under orders from Souvanna Phouma. On May Day 1975, Pathet Lao and leftist demonstrators in Laotian cities rode US-made jeeps and Soviet-made PT-76 tanks and denounced the US, demanded the resignation of rightist cabinet members, and hailed the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam to the communists. Prominent Pathet Lao communist Phoumi Vongvichit announced on national radio that the Hmong must be “*taken out at the roots.*” A repentant Yang Dao presented a paper in 1981 which stated “*At first I did not realize that a plan of extermination carefully set in place in Moscow and its allies was about to be put into motion against the Hmong of Laos. On May 9, 1975 returning from my trip to the communist countries of Asia and Europe I received confirmation through the Khaosane Pathet Lao, the Pravda of the Laotian Communist Party which wrote ‘We must eradicate the Meo minority completely.’*” In May 1975, Royal Lao and Pathet Lao troops collaborated in preventing Hmong civilians and officials from leaving Laos. In June 1975, Radio Pathet Lao reported that Royal Lao Army requested Pathet Lao advisers. The Vientiane Domestic Service disseminated Order 904 which confiscated all firearms. All citizens were required to turn in all firearms to “*arsenal depots in their respective military regions.*” One refugee recounted that the Pathet Lao moved in “*many soldiers, trucks, and two big tanks...The PL took over CIA headquarters and ordered everyone over age 9 to attend day long reeducation classes.*” Large numbers of Lao and Hmong were placed in so called “*seminar camps.*” The

“Red Hmong” were also used by the regular Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces to conquer Laos.¹³⁶

In June and July 1975, many provinces fell to the Pathet Lao and took over the USAID compound at Kilometer 6. The US Embassy was pressured to reduce their staff to 22. In late July 1975, Souvanna Phouma ordered that all military commanders, provincial chiefs, and other non-communist officials to go to Vientiane for a meeting. They were all detained. The mixed Royal/Pathet Lao forces created by the 1973 Agreement were disbanded and the new Minister of Defense ordered all rightists to turn in their weapons. Soviet helicopters and planes, along with Royal Lao government planes assisted in the arrests of the rightist and non-communist officials. In late August 1975, the Laotian border with Thailand was closed. By September 1975, all professionals, civil servants, and businessmen were arrested and placed in “*seminar camps*.” As a result of a secret meeting at K-6, the former American compound in November 1975, the Pathet Lao abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Laos People’s Democratic Republic in December 1975. Lists of former Laotians who worked for American agencies and trained military forces were captured by the Pathet Lao and used in the purges that were occurring. Pathet Lao lecturers stated to the prisoners at the seminar camps assertions such as: “*Marxism was very strong and the only country that resisted Marxism was the United States. No longer did the Marxist worry about England, France, or other European countries; they were no longer a threat to Marxism and no longer resisted. Only the United States resisted...*” Thus, the Pathet Lao took over Laos by December 1975 by a combination of foreign troop intervention, neutralization through propaganda, and false promises of a future Laos rife with peace and cooperation between the Royal Lao government and the Pathet Lao.¹³⁷

In 1979, Soviet General V.K. Pikolov visited Laos with a 500 man team to inspect LPLA chemical weapons warehouses and train LPLA troops in chemical and conventional warfare. They actually ran the Laotian Air Force.¹³⁸ Laos sent troops to aid Vietnam in its 1979 conquest of Democratic Kampuchea. Over 180 Soviet, Czech, and Hungarian soldiers who posed as technicians built strategic roads in Laos near Savannakhet.¹³⁹ Meanwhile, Pathet Lao atrocities against the Hmong continued. In 1979, a defecting LPLA pilot defected and revealed that he was ordered since 1976 to carry out “*Extinct Destruction Operations*” which was intended to “*wipe out the reactionary Hmong people*.” Chemical and conventional weapons were used.

The Pathet Lao also followed a similar strategy of the North Vietnamese in coopting Western leftists to boost the image of its communist regime in the court of world public opinion. By 1980, the ruling Pathet Lao government used Westerners to convince world public opinion that the seminar camps were closed by late 1980. A US professor Dr. MacAlister Brown gave a lecture in Thailand that indicated he was told by Laotian ministry officials that the seminar camps were closed. The Mennonite and AFSC were the only private religious groups from the US allowed to conduct outreach efforts in Laos. One Mennonite official Frederick Swartzendruber served in Laos from 1979-1981 and was given guided tours of the country aboard Soviet helicopters. He advanced the theory of the damages and deaths caused by the yellow rain chemical weapons as simply being “*bee feces*.” Swartzendruber also participated in

¹³⁶ Ibid pages 320-337.

¹³⁷ Ibid pages 362-376.

¹³⁸ Ibid page 417.

¹³⁹ Scott, Joanna. Indochina’s Refugees: Oral Histories from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (McFarland 1989) page 253.

tours of alleged Hmong markets, where people were allegedly shopping. Anti-Vietnam War activists in the US denounced Gen. Vang Pao. Laotian agents trained by Vietnam were sent to the US as refugees and entered because of a sloppy screening process. They threatened former Royal Lao Army General Vang Pao with untraceable poisoning and other death threats. One refugee Thao Yia stated in 1985 that *“I’m worried that American ‘Reds’ and the US will make relations with Laos so we can’t take back Laos. I see Red Lao who come here as refugees. In Fresno I see Red Lao come here to visit sent by the Lao government to tell the refugees propaganda. They also collect money from refugees here saying they’ll take it to their families in Laos. They are only here to make money for themselves. There were four Red Hmong in Fresno last week. These Red Hmong and Red Lao start rumors in California to cause problems for Hmong living in America.”* The US Committee on Refugees and the Mennonites blamed the Hmong resistance for the violence and atrocities in Laos by the Pathet Lao at a human rights conference with the Laotian charge d’affaires to the United States present. A State Department official and the Laotian charge d’affaires traveled to this conference together. This illustrated the fact that the Bush Administration also helped to collude with American leftists and the Pathet Lao in covering up communist atrocities.¹⁴⁰

The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was also assisted by the Red Chinese, North Vietnamese, and other communist powers. Chhang Song, Director of the Ministry of Information in the Khmer Republic and an assistant in the cabinet of Prince Sihanouk reported that the Soviets and Chinese had lots of intelligence personnel in their embassies in Phnom Penh who were described as *“basically KGB types”* that aided the Khmer Rouge, the North Vietnamese, and the Vietcong. Khieu Samphan was saved from the authorities by the Chinese Embassy.¹⁴¹ In October 1973, the USSR withdrew much of their Embassy staff from Phnom Penh and opened a channel to the Khmer Rouge based in China. The Khmer Rouge received money from China to maintain its diplomatic missions and also received weapons from North Korea and Cuba. The North Vietnamese also provided the Khmer Rouge with AK-47s, 12.7 mm machine guns, 82 mm mortars, Soviet-made 122 mm rocket launchers, and Chinese-made 107 mm rocket launchers.¹⁴² A US Embassy document noted that Soviet support for the Khmer Rouge focused in on *“the recent military successes of the Khmer Rouge forces; the alleged military and economic weakness of the Phnom Penh regime; and Moscow’s support for the ‘just cause of the liberator.”*¹⁴³

The North Vietnamese also provided troops and advisers during the Khmer Rouge’s battles against the authoritarian pro-US government of President Lon Nol. Frank Snepp noted that the North Vietnamese provided the Khmer Rouge in 1975 with captured US-made 105mm howitzers.¹⁴⁴ A Red Chinese official in 1977 noted that the North Vietnamese sent two army divisions to assist the Khmer Rouge in the conquest of Phnom Penh. Vietnam later claimed that their army provided artillery support to the Khmer Rouge. A State Department official T. Carney reported that the North Vietnamese developed a shield that protected the Khmer Rouge in eastern

¹⁴⁰ Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains (Indiana University Press 1993) pages 448-449 and 502-503.

¹⁴¹ Santoli, Al. To Bear Any Burden (Indiana University Press 1999) 222-223.

¹⁴² Jackson, Karl D. Cambodia 1975-1978 (Princeton University Press 1992) page 32.

¹⁴³ Department of State, Operations Center. “Soviet Support for Khmer Insurgents” Accessed From: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975STATE052840_b.html

¹⁴⁴ Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime (Yale University Press 2008) page 102.

Cambodia from 1970 to 1972. Communist “*journalist*” and KGB agent Wilfred Burchett noted that North Vietnamese artillerymen assisted the Khmer Rouge in the final offensive against government forces in 1975. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam Vo Dong Giang noted in 1980 that the mortar operators among the Khmer Rouge forces were all North Vietnamese soldiers.¹⁴⁵

After the Khmer Rouge conquest of Cambodia in April 1975 and renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea, relations between Hanoi and Phnom Penh were relatively inconsistent. On the one hand, the Khmer Rouge deeply distrusted North Vietnamese intentions for an Indochina under Hanoi’s sole control. Yet Hanoi and Phnom Penh also maintained party-to-party, trade, and diplomatic relations. Some reports indicated that the war booty captured by the Khmer Rouge were diverted to North Vietnam either in barter exchanges or to repay the North Vietnamese for their wartime assistance. You Kim Lanh noted that he “*had to search all the houses and collect any rice left in them and stock up the medicine from all the pharmacies. We loaded everything onto boats run by Vietnamese crews.*” Yen Savvanarry noted that there was steady traffic on Highway 1 in late April 1975 to Saigon. The Khmer Rouge transported radios, motorcycles, and other small vehicles, weapons, bicycles, packaged medicines, 105mm howitzers, and cars, such as Mercedes and Peugeot 404s to North Vietnamese-occupied South Vietnam.¹⁴⁶ The Khmer Rouge reportedly used American-made jeeps and Red Chinese-built trucks to transport chairs, refrigerators, air conditioners, fans, TVs, and sacks and bags of unknown merchandise to North Vietnam. These captured goods were either sold or given to the North Vietnamese at no charge.¹⁴⁷ The first harvest in Democratic Kampuchea was partially exported to Vietnam.¹⁴⁸ In July 1976, the civil aviation authorities of Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea opened up direct air routes between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea.¹⁴⁹ Vietnamese ships docked at Phnom Penh and unloaded salt, while Democratic Kampuchea imported 500,000 meters of Vietnamese cloth.¹⁵⁰

In addition to the heavy Red Chinese presence, other communist countries provided scattered assistance to the Khmer Rouge during their period in power from 1975 to 1979. In September 1977, Kim Jong-il of North Korea congratulated the Khmer Rouge on its 17th anniversary and for having “*wiped out...counterrevolutionary group of spies who had committed subversive activities and sabotage*” The two top leaders in the Khmer Rouge security apparatus met with North Korean intelligence and held several working level meetings where they received material aid and training. North Korea also sent advisers to Democratic Kampuchea to teach the Khmer Rouge torture and to improve the functioning of Democratic Kampuchean security cadres.¹⁵¹

An unnamed high official of US intelligence indicated in May 1975 that the Soviet Union and China were “*egging on the Khmer Rouge regime.*” The Soviets and Chinese congratulated

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, pages 75 and 99.

¹⁴⁶ Ponchaud, Francois. Cambodia Year Zero (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978) pages 31-32.

¹⁴⁷ Ngor, Haing. A Cambodian Odyssey (Macmillan, 1987) pages 99-100.

¹⁴⁸ Paul, Anthony and Barron, John. Murder of a Gentle Land (Reader’s Digest Press: distributed by Crowell 1977) page 198.

¹⁴⁹ “Accord On Air Route Reached With SRV” Phnom Penh Domestic Service July 26, 1976

¹⁵⁰ Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime (Yale University Press 2008) pages 128 and 123.

¹⁵¹ Thayer, Nate. “Pol Pot Meets Kim il-Sung” September 12, 2012 Accessed From <http://www.nate-thayer.com/pol-pot-meets-kim-il-sung/>

the Phnom Penh regime for its capture of the Mayaguez. This was based on intercepted radio communications between Moscow, Peking, and Phnom Penh. This unnamed official noted *“I can only say that nothing in the messages carried any suggestion that the Cambodians should back down.”*¹⁵²

Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge also hailed what it viewed as the collapse of the US economy. In that respect, Phnom Penh’s propaganda mirrored that of North Vietnam and other communist states. In February 1978, Radio Phnom Penh noted this about a coal strike in the US: *“The strike was first launched in an effort to resist the cruel oppression and exploitation committed by the US monopoly capitalists and to demand and protect workers’ rights which have been incessantly violated by these monopoly capitalists in their bid to accumulate more wealth by bleeding the workers white.”* The Khmer Rouge also noted that the strike increased *“the already serious energy crisis that US imperialism is experiencing.”*¹⁵³ In October 1977, Radio Phnom Penh noted that *“The oil producing countries have used oil as an effective weapon with which to strike at the big capitalist countries and especially at US imperialism.”* The radio also noted that *“the US economic crisis has created three difficulties for US imperialism”* which the radio listed as *loss of confidence in the US dollar, the trade deficit, and unemployment.*¹⁵⁴

The Khmer Rouge also praised the role of the antiwar Left in assisting in their seizure of power. The peace movement and the New Left played a critical role in pressuring Congress and the Ford Administration in reducing and eliminating US aid for the Lon Nol government. In September 1975, Foreign Minister Ieng Sary visited New York City and met with American leftists and antiwar activists. Sary commented that the Khmer Rouge *“always remembered that the American people were supporting us.”* He stated *“This victory is not the victory of the Cambodian people alone, it is the victory of all the people, the American people included—especially the American youth and the people that love peace and justice.”* Sary stated *“The Cambodian people know you very well, especially students who are fighting on our behalf, especially your students at Jackson state and Kent State...we always remembered the American people as friends, and especially the people of New York City.”*¹⁵⁵ Gunnar Bergstrom of the Swedish-Cambodian Friendship Association visited Democratic Kampuchea in 1978. He noted that *“I was at that time a member of a friendship association which was a remnant of the anti-Vietnam/Cambodia War movement in Sweden, which was very strong in the Western world...Of course we didn't want to believe that the liberators had become oppressors.”* Bergstrom enjoyed sumptuous meals of rice, chicken, fish, and oysters with high ranking Khmer Rouge officials such as Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.¹⁵⁶ Historian Sophal Ear noted that the Indochina Resource Center was *“the Khmer Rouge’s most effective apologists in the West.”* By 1978, the Chinese launched a propaganda campaign to defend the Democratic Kampuchea regime and distributed films such as

¹⁵² Tully, Andrew. “Mayaguez Story: A Warning” Lodi News Sentinel May 20, 1975 page 4.

¹⁵³ “US Coal Mines Strike Noted” Phnom Penh Domestic Service February 6, 1978

¹⁵⁴ “Radio Notes US Economic Problems” Phnom Penh Domestic Service October 3, 1977

¹⁵⁵ “Address by Mr. Ieng Sary” September 6, 1975 on Indochina Resource Center Letter Head

Accessed From: <http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?eKnmuFLMs0BEHzdQSHSWJL9TFpaRTIjB04Ae.apzZ@yApeOvZ1QJRKKeitDCRTg5ObPAOf4IYbmFJBdPDGKsWpY9UQjFtbJ6it706BGseps/2430803022.pdf>

¹⁵⁶ Kinetz, Erika. “Pol Pot’s Former Dinner Guest Admits to Lapse in Judgment” The Cambodia Daily November 1, 2007 Accessed From: <http://www.cambodiadaily.com/stories-of-the-month/pol-pots-former-dinner-guest-admits-to-lapse-in-judgment-279/>

Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward and printed glossy magazines. When Foreign Minister Ieng Sary traveled to New York in 1978, he screened the film mentioned above and distributed glossy propaganda magazines.¹⁵⁷

The Khmer Rouge also saw itself as the purveyor of communist revolution in the remaining noncommunist countries in Southeast Asia. In October 1976, a Congress of the high-ranking personnel of the Democratic Kampuchean Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: “...we must strengthen and expand relationships with friends all over the world, especially revolutionary and peace-loving nations to defeat the American imperialists and the free (world). Concentrate mainly on the revolutionary forces in Southeast Asia and the progressive forces in both the Nonaligned Nations and the Third World and secondarily on the forces of justice in the world. Essentially, we must gather the revolutionary force in Southeast Asia such as in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia etc. We must pay attention to the close solidarity, mutual help, and the progressive force in the neutral block and the forces of justice. Pay attention to close solidarity with the pure Marxist-Leninist forces, especially those with no conflicts with us...Continue to fight to get friends in Southeast Asia and to make friends with the neutral countries in the world as well...Pay attention to solidarity with Marxist parties.”¹⁵⁸ In January 1978, the Thai military admitted that Democratic Kampuchea supported the Thai Communist Party with weapons and military training. They also admitted that Democratic Kampuchean troops accompanied Thai Communist Party forces during invasions of Thai territory. Sometimes Democratic Kampuchean troops directly attacked Thai border villages in 1977 and 1978.¹⁵⁹

The Vietnamese Communists sought to install a friendly puppet government in Phnom Penh by 1978 and gathered Khmer Rouge defectors and pro-Vietnamese elements of the Cambodian Communist movement into a coalition that would form a new regime. The Vietnamese engaged in meticulous planning for the invasion and occupation of Democratic Kampuchea. In April 1979, the Red Chinese reportedly captured Vietnamese documents that dated from January 17, 1979. These hand-written documents were titled “*On the war along the south-western border and the victory in smashing the Kampuchean reactionary clique*” and originated from the 1st Military District of the Vietnamese army and the commander of the First Company of the First Battalion of the 567th Regiment under the Cao Bang Provincial Military Command. The document stated: “*The fourth plenum convened by the Central Committee passed a resolution which explicitly stated that our basic and long-term enemy was US imperialism; while ‘our direct enemies’ and ‘the direct targets of war’ were ‘Peking and Kampuchea’... After the Central Committee adopted this resolution (in June and July 1978), we were determined to win quick political and military victories along the south-western border. It was an important task from beginning to end...the plan of the operation was divided into two phases of attack. The first phase of the operation was to attack Kampuchean combat effectives in border areas (from 26th December 1978 to 1st January 1979). The second phase was the liberation of Phnom Penh...*” Another Vietnamese document stated “*We must establish a front*

¹⁵⁷ Maguire, Peter. Facing Death in Cambodia (Columbia University Press 2013) page 55.

¹⁵⁸ “The B-1 Ministry Congress (10-7-1976)” Accessed From:

http://www.yale.edu/cgp/iengsary.htm#BM_E_THE_B_1_MINISTRY_CONGRESS_10_7_19

¹⁵⁹ Morris, Stephen J. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War (Stanford University Press 1999) pages 78-81.

including six categories of people such as those who sided with Vietnam at the beginning of the period of resistance against the United States in Kampuchea... We have enough conditions to help friends conduct revolution once again... There is only one such previous example in the world... the Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia in 1968."¹⁶⁰

Hanoi's ambitions clearly went beyond the subjugation of Laos and Democratic Kampuchea. Vietnamese communist National Assembly defector Nguyen Cong Hoan noted *"During the first session of the unified National Assembly held in Hanoi in June 1976 we were given a copy of a document entitled Vietnam-Southeast Asia which was subsequently taken back because of its sensitive nature. At this same session Mr. Tran Quynh private secretary to Le Duan told me 'The liberation of Thailand will be next. It is a historical necessity and a responsibility of ours.'*"¹⁶¹

As of June 1981, sources reported that Vietnam had a plan to occupy Thailand by 1982 or 1983. These plans were gleaned from conversations between Thai military and police officials and Laotian soldiers stationed on the border. A report by the Thai newspaper Matichon noted *"Vietnam has instructed Vietnamese refugees in Thailand to slip into provinces throughout Thailand to assist future Vietnamese military actions in Thailand. The refugees were also instructed to time their sabotage of government buildings and people's homes to coincide with and to create confusion, thereby facilitating Vietnamese occupation attempts... since May 1981 Vietnam has moved forces from Danang through Highways 9 and 13 to Saravane, Champassak and Attapeu. On 2nd May, 21 military trucks were sighted, while six more trucks were sighted on 6th May and 25 others on 8th May. The report says a battalion of Cuban and Soviet soldiers are located at (Phou Kongtoun) in (Phou Kongtoun) Canton, Saravane Province. These soldiers advise Lao soldiers in the field and at various Lao military headquarters. A total of 30 medium and large tanks, two trucks and a total of 37 artillery and anti-aircraft guns were seen at (Phou Bachiang) camp in Pakse town. A radar station manned by three Vietnamese soldiers and guarded by a platoon of Vietnamese troops was located at a former ammunition storage building in Pakse about 150 m west of Highway 13... large numbers of Lao have been conscripted for military service and posted in areas along Laos' southern border with Thailand. Laos has also claimed that it will launch a battle with Thailand sometime in the future.*"¹⁶²

A defector from the Vietnamese puppet People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) Pom Delis noted in June 1980 that: *"Great interest was aroused over a recent meeting concerned with 'military preparedness' including strategy against Thailand as the 'next target.'* A map of Thailand was issued. Presided over by Prime Minister Heng Samrin, the meeting was attended by Vietnamese, Soviet, Cuban, East German, and Hungarian officials. The Vietnamese said that they had been fighting for 20 years while Thailand had not had battle experience." It was significant to note that Pom was the secretary and wife of Ros Samay, the PRK Minister for Economic Affairs.¹⁶³

In September 1979, a captured Vietnamese spy named Phan Vinh Hoi alleged that the *"Vietnamese Party leaders and army commanders have frequently made it known that once they*

¹⁶⁰ "Chinese Comment on Vietnamese Documents on Kampuchea" New China News Agency April 2, 1979

¹⁶¹ Santoli, Al. To Bear Any Burden (Indiana University Press 1999) page 288.

¹⁶² "Thai Paper Reports Vietnam's Plans to Occupy Thailand" Bangkok Matichon June 1, 1981

¹⁶³ "Disclosures on Heng Samrin Regime by Ros Samay's Ex-Wife" Bangkok Post June 19, 1980

have seized the whole of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese forces will immediately attack Thailand.”¹⁶⁴

In July 1983, the Vietnamese and Laotians reportedly created a task force near Vientiane to organize infiltration and subversion of Thailand in the “*national salvation*” style of Hanoi’s invasion of Democratic Kampuchea. This task force also controlled a group of 100 Thai Communist Party troops in Laos. According to the Bangkok Post, the first attempt at a Vietnamese conquest of Thailand occurred from “1976 to 1977 when Hanoi offered to supply three regiments to the CPT to help ‘liberate’ the north-east. The forces were supposed to be ‘volunteers’ sent to aid the indigenous insurgents. The situation in Thailand at that time was very critical with students and other youths going into the jungles to join the communists. Several went to Laos and were formed into a group to act as the Thai nucleus for the Vietnamese armed force to make the proposed incursion across the Mekong River...Among the designations given the new party of Thai communists is the name ‘national salvation movement party’ - almost the same wording for the Kampuchean group headed by Heng Samrin who became Hanoi’s puppet in Phnom Penh. The CPT’s pro-Peking Politburo, however, turned down the offer. The Thai government’s declaration of amnesty has also drawn many Thais out of the jungles and from Laos, thus robbing the Vietnamese of the essential Thai core for the ‘salvation movement.’ Intelligence sources described the offer to the CPT as the precursor to the Vietnamese pattern of organizing and using a local communist organization sympathetic to itself as a ‘front’ for turning unstable domestic conditions to their advantage for the purpose of seizing control from within the target country.”¹⁶⁵

Richard Gabriel speculated that “...the present deployment of Vietnamese Army divisions in Kampuchea could permit a rapid advance from the border to Bangkok, using the unobstructed approach afforded by the ‘Wattana Corridor,’ while the remaining PAVN divisions continued their campaign against Khmer Rouge remnants. The Vietnamese are superior in every combat element and have substantially more experience than the Thailand Army.”¹⁶⁶

The Vietnamese continued to flood Southeast Asia with intelligence officers in order to gain information, goods, and to sow subversion. As of August 1979, a defecting Vietnamese intelligence official noted that Hanoi dispatched agents to Hong Kong through infiltration on Vietnamese freighters. These Vietnamese agents posed as refugees. The divisions of the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security that were responsible for infiltrating Hanoi’s agents were the Dispatching Bureau and the Political Security Bureau. In the late 1970s, Vietnam sent intelligence officers to East Germany and the USSR for advanced training. Moscow and East Berlin also provided sophisticated espionage equipment to the Vietnamese intelligence service. The Vietnamese agents infiltrated via merchant vessels were dispatched to spy in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and the Middle East.¹⁶⁷ As of September 1981, Soviet KGB agents in Thailand

¹⁶⁴ “Confession of Vietnamese Spy Captured in Cambodia” VODK September 4, 1979

¹⁶⁵ “Thailand Alleges Vietnam has Set up Task Force in Laos for Infiltration” Bangkok Post July 26, 1983

¹⁶⁶ Gabriel, Richard A. Fighting Armies: Nonaligned, Third World, and Other Ground Armies, A Combat Assessment (Greenwood Press, 1983)page 63.

¹⁶⁷ “Viet Nam’s Spying in Hongkong Revealed” Xinhua General News Service August 28, 1979

collaborated with Eastern European, Laotian, and Vietnamese diplomats that were resident in Bangkok.¹⁶⁸

In September 1980, it was reported that Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime set up a center that trained special agents in Siem Reap Province to pave the way for Hanoi's conquest of Thailand. The centers had 50 trainees, who were Kampuchians of Vietnamese nationality who spoke Thai fluently.¹⁶⁹ In October 1979, the Vietnamese opened a pacification and espionage course in Battambang. These agents were to infiltrate Thailand as refugees where they would *"collect information, stir up opinion on Thai internal affairs, destroy Thai peasants' crops, and plunder storages and any Thai property they can."* The instructors were Soviets who taught espionage, camouflage, and sabotage techniques.¹⁷⁰

The Vietnamese clearly were ready to use chemical weapons in an effort to attack Thailand. After all, Hanoi deployed chemical weapons against the South Vietnamese, US forces, Democratic Kampuchea, Hmong rebels in Laos, and the Red Chinese. A Vietnamese artillery officer reported to Agence France Presse that the poison gases used to defeat Democratic Kampuchea originated from the USSR, Red China, and captured stocks leftover from the South Vietnamese army. During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese used captured stocks of South Vietnamese and US-made CS and DM nausea gas in tear gas grenades and mortar shells. It was reported that Red China possibly provided North Vietnam with CS grenades. A July 1981 Soviet shipment of crates destined to Ho Chi Minh City reportedly contained *"deadly toxic chemicals."*¹⁷¹

The Vietnamese Communists publically praised and admitted the important role played by chemical weapons in the battle for Indochina. In April 1980, the chemical armed branch of the Vietnamese army received the Ho Chi Minh Order, Third Class by Vice-Minister of Defense Col-Gen Le Trong Tan, who was a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Military Party Committee's Standing Committee. Col-Gen Le Trong Tan noted that *"the branch's cadres and combatants have actively studied and mastered science and technology and have been brave, resourceful and creative in combat and combat support. Together with the whole people and the entire army, they countered enemy acts and, with chemical weapons, contributed to the great victory in the anti-US national salvation resistance struggle. Units of the chemical armed branch also used colored smoke successfully to protect some important work. In the North, during the years of the US imperialists' war of destruction, the branch initially trained a force of command and technical cadres who displayed high combat spirit and ability...To fulfill the tasks in the new situation, cadres and combatants of the chemical armed branch must be thoroughly imbued with the revolutionary line and tasks, the military line of the Party and the branch's tasks in a war of national defense. They must carry out satisfactorily scientific and technological research and train themselves actively to manage and use effectively the weapons and equipment allotted to them. As their immediate goal, the units*

¹⁶⁸ "Thai Weekly Exposes KGB Activities in Thailand" Xinhua General News Service September 3, 1981

¹⁶⁹ "Special Agents Trained in Cambodia to Spy on Thailand" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts September 20, 1980

¹⁷⁰ "Other Reports on Cambodia; Soviet Instructors Training Spies in Cambodia" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts October 12, 1979

¹⁷¹ Burck, Gordon and Flowerree, Charles C. International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (Greenwood Press 1991) pages 378-402.

must accelerate the campaign to develop the fine traditions and increase the fighting strength of the people's armed forces; pay attention to observing discipline; strive to build themselves into standard units; and actively engage in production in order to improve the soldiers' material and spiritual life."¹⁷²

In conclusion, the evidence clearly illustrates how the North Vietnamese and their Indochinese allies utilized the psychological warfare to evict first the French and later the Americans. These efforts resulted in the eventual communist occupation of almost all of Indochina. The Soviet-Chinese axis also provided massive military assistance, including troop support to the North Vietnamese and their Indochinese allies. To this day, Vietnam dominates Cambodia (through the Cambodian People's Party-formerly the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party) and Laos (through the ruling Pathet Lao). Despite tensions with China, Hanoi is still ideologically aligned with Beijing. Since the early 2000s, communist Vietnam also forged closer ties with Putin's Russian Federation. In all likelihood, if a Third World War broke out between the United States and the Sino-Russian alliance, Vietnam would assuredly join America's enemies. Presently, American big business is also pushing for the passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which will provide political legitimacy and economic benefits to Hanoi and quite possibly Red China. Young patriots, conservatives, and other anti-communists should remember the true history and circumstances of the Vietnam War and reject any current propaganda campaigns on behalf of the ruling communists in Hanoi. Meanwhile, much of the American Left is still in thrall of communist Vietnam. Such support stemmed from a common "*anti-imperialism*" and adherence to "*progressive socialist*" ideals. Many American leftists are still bitter at US involvement in supporting Indochinese anti-communist governments. However, Hanoi's rulers are a gang of corrupt, totalitarian, and anti-worker communists who cooperate with multinational corporations in outsourcing and the oppression of labor. Disaffected leftists and conservatives need to forge an anti-communist front in an effort to spread freedom.

¹⁷² "Award Presented to Vietnamese Army's Chemical Branch" Hanoi Home Service April 23, 1980